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Abstract 
We explore the effects of disability discrimination laws on hiring of older workers.  A concern with anti-
discrimination laws is that they may reduce hiring by raising the cost of terminations and – in the specific 
case of disability discrimination laws – raising the cost of employment because of the need to 
accommodate disabled workers.  Moreover, disability discrimination laws can affect nondisabled older 
workers because they are fairly likely to develop work-related disabilities, yet are not protected by these 
laws.  Using state variation in disability discrimination protections, we find little or no evidence that 
stronger disability discrimination laws lower the hiring of nondisabled older workers.  We similarly find 
no evidence of adverse effects of disability discrimination laws on hiring of disabled older workers. 
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In coming decades the share of the population aged 65 and older will rise sharply – from 17 
percent of those aged 20 and older in 2000, to 28 percent in 2050 (projected) – and will approach equality 
with the share aged 45-64 by the middle of the century (Neumark, 2008).  The aging of the population 
creates an imperative to increase the employment of older workers – lowering dependency ratios, raising 
tax revenues, and decreasing public expenditures on health insurance, retirement benefits, and income 
support.   
Supply-side policy to encourage longer work lives – such as the 1983 Social Security reforms that 
reduced benefits at the early retirement age of 62 and raised the full retirement age (the FRA, at which 
full benefits are available) – can potentially help.  However, such policy reforms to increase the 
employment of older workers may be frustrated by discrimination against older workers.  Discrimination 
against older workers in hiring is a particularly important issue, since serious progress in extending work 
lives of older individuals is likely going to have to come from employment in new part-time or shorter-
term “partial retirement” or “bridge jobs,” rather than from continued employment of workers in their 
long-term career jobs (e.g., Cahill et al., 2006; Johnson et al., 2009), in part because some older workers 
will need to make transitions to jobs that are less physically taxing.   
The natural response to the potential for hiring (and more general) discrimination against older 
workers is to strengthen laws against age discrimination.  Earlier research on the effects of age 
discrimination laws on employment of older workers found that when age discrimination laws were 
passed, they increased employment of protected workers, likely in large part by reducing opportunistic 
terminations of higher-cost older workers (Neumark and Stock, 1999; Adams, 2004).  More recently, 
Neumark and Song (2013) found that stronger state-level age discrimination protections enhanced the 
impact of the 1983 Social Security reforms; for older individuals for whom early retirement benefits fell 
and the FRA increased, stronger state protections were associated with delayed benefit claiming and 
increases in employment. 
However, age discrimination laws could boost employment of older workers by reducing 
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terminations, without necessarily increasing their hiring, and could even reduce hiring of older workers. 
Because in hiring cases it is difficult to identify a class of affected workers, and economic damages are 
smaller than in termination cases, age discrimination laws may not spur much enforcement against hiring 
discrimination.  Moreover, if age discrimination laws mainly raise the costs of terminating older workers, 
and the laws are not effective on the hiring side, then age discrimination protections could end up 
deterring hiring of older workers (Bloch, 1994; Lahey, 2008b; Posner, 1995).1  Some studies conclude 
that there is age discrimination in hiring (Bendick et al., 1996, 1999; Lahey, 2008a), while research that 
tries to directly estimate the effects of age discrimination laws on hiring is sparse and mixed.  Lahey 
(2008b) argues that there is some evidence that stronger state age discrimination laws deter hiring.  
Neumark and Song (2013) find evidence – although it is weak – that stronger state age discrimination 
protections boosted hiring of older workers affected by increases in the FRA.  Neumark and Button 
(2014) find that stronger state age discrimination protections were associated with less hiring of older 
workers during and after the Great Recession, which they suggest could reflect uncertainty about future 
demand facing firms enhancing the fear of higher termination costs that stronger age discrimination 
protections can impose.   
                                                 
1 This is consistent with more general research on employment protection legislation.  For example, Behaghel et al. 
(2004) find that when firing costs were eliminated in France for hiring workers over age 50 were eliminated, 
hiring of older workers increased.   
In this paper, we turn our attention to disability discrimination laws, exploring whether these laws 
are ultimately likely to be a help or a hindrance in achieving the goal of significant lengthening of the 
work lives of older individuals, via their effect on hiring.  Although disability discrimination laws do not 
specifically define older disabled workers as a protected class, the incidence of disabilities that can limit 
work and hence trigger protection by disability discrimination laws rises steeply with age, especially past 
age 50 or so; see Rowe and Kahn, 1997, and Figure 1 below).  This is recognized in the Americans with 
Disabilities Act (ADA), which notes that the number of disabled “is increasing as the population as a 
whole is growing older.”  The implication is that older workers may be disproportionately affected by 
disability discrimination laws.  Moreover, the perception that a potential worker has a disability or is 
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likely to have one in the near future should also rise steeply with age, and that perception – for reasons 
argued in this paper – may be particularly likely to affect older workers adversely. 
Scholars have argued that disability discrimination laws may do more to protect older workers 
than age discrimination laws.  In discussing the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), Sterns and 
Miklos (1995) suggest that “Many of the ailments associated with older adulthood are now classified as 
disabilities.  Arthritis and back ailments are examples.  ADA provides equal protection to workers of all 
ages and … will benefit older workers without directly protecting them at a certain age” (1995, pp. 251-
2).  One consequence of the overlap between age and disability is that many aggrieved older workers may 
have the option of pursuing discrimination claims under either the Age Discrimination in Employment 
Act (ADEA) or the ADA.  Claims filed under the ADA may be more successful because, unlike the 
ADEA, the ADA does not include an exception for bona fide occupational qualifications (BFOQs).2  
(Under the ADEA, BFOQ exceptions arise when age is strongly associated with other factors that pose 
legitimate business or safety concerns.)  Because the ADA does not have a BFOQ exception, it may offer 
greater protection to older workers suffering from some of the milder adverse consequences of aging that, 
under the ADEA, might be grounds for discharge or failure to hire (Posner, 1995).  That is, age 
discrimination laws, in contrast to disability discrimination laws, do not rule out factors associated with 
age – such as physical impairments – as grounds for discrimination, under a “business necessity” defense 
(Starkman, 1992).  Further, the age-related disability might still be judged as amenable to “reasonable 
accommodation” by employers in the language of the ADA or state disability laws, which usually require 
“reasonable accommodation” of the worker, making it much harder to justify an apparently 
discriminatory practice on the basis of business necessity (Gardner and Campanella, 1991).  Moreover, 
because of the relationship between age and disability, as the population ages, more of those individuals 
protected by the ADEA are also likely to come under the protection of the ADA.  
                                                 
2 See Stock and Beegle (2004) for similar arguments.  
But this can cut two ways.  Specifically, the concern that antidiscrimination laws may deter hiring 
of older workers is potentially more powerful with respect to disability discrimination laws than age 
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discrimination laws, for two reasons – one having to do with the relationship between aging and 
disability, and one having to do with the nature of disability discrimination laws.  First, as noted above, 
disability discrimination laws have important features that may make them more powerful than age 
discrimination laws at protecting workers from discrimination.  But these features may also raise the cost 
of employing an older worker who is disabled or who might become disabled, perhaps most notably 
because of the requirement for reasonable accommodation of disabilities.  As such, disability 
discrimination laws can pose higher potential costs to employers than do age discrimination laws – with 
both more grounds for a discrimination claim resulting from a termination decision, and direct costs from 
having to accommodate an older worker with a disability or who develops a disability.  Moreover, an 
employer would likely regard the probability that an older worker becomes disabled and requires 
accommodation as higher than the probability that an older worker is terminated and files a spurious age 
discrimination claim.   
Second, disability discrimination protections could affect hiring of nondisabled older workers 
because employers know that older workers have a higher likelihood of developing a physical impairment 
by virtue of their age, and the disability laws do not protect them if they are not yet disabled.  Indeed 
consistent with this conjecture, research on age stereotypes notes that experimental subjects were more 
likely to reject the request of an older worker for a transfer to a physically-demanding job (Rosen and 
Jerdee, 1976), and that there were negative stereotypes about older workers’ mental health (Hummert, 
1990; Goebel, 1984).   
We would not expect employers to be very responsive to the possibility that a younger worker 
will become disabled, because the probability is low (although it could be magnified by the prospect of 
longer tenure compared to older workers).  However, this probability is considerably higher for older 
workers, and hence in studying whether disability discrimination laws deter hiring or older workers, it is 
particularly interesting to look at hiring of nondisabled older workers.      
Like age discrimination laws, disability discrimination laws vary across states, perhaps in ways 
that are more significant than variation in age discrimination laws.  The research strategy we use in this 
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paper exploits this state variation in disability discrimination laws, and how it is associated with hiring of 
older workers.  While past research studied the effects of much earlier variation in state disability 
discrimination laws (e.g., Beegle and Stock, 2003) or variation induced by the implementation of the 
Americans with Disabilities Act or the ADA (e.g., Acemoglu and Angrist, 2001), our paper is the first to 
study the effects of contemporaneous variation in state disability discrimination laws.   
In the post-ADA period covered by our data there is virtually no variation in state disability 
discrimination laws.3  Hence, we are constrained to study cross-state hiring variation associated with 
these laws.  Moreover, because – as we have argued – disability discrimination laws can affect both the 
disabled and the nondisabled, we cannot use effects on protected versus unprotected groups to provide a 
second level of differencing that might control for some sources of variation that confound cross-state 
differences between outcomes (hiring rates, in our case).  Despite our limited ability to test the effects of 
disability discrimination laws in as compelling a fashion that is more commonly used to study the effects 
of variation in laws across states, we believe our paper broaches an important question regarding 
disability discrimination laws and older workers, and provides some interesting first evidence.   
                                                 
3 We use the HRS, which begins in 1992.  We also use the Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP) for 
the same period.  We could take the SIPP data back further, exploiting pre-ADA variation in state laws (the ADA 
was passed in 1991); pre-ADA variation is studied by Beegle and Stock (2003) and Stock and Beegle (2004), 
discussed below.     
4 See the review in Jones (2008).   
 
II. Related Research 
Existing research on the effects of disability discrimination laws on labor market outcomes 
considers different questions from those we study.4  Studies by Acemoglu and Angrist (2001) and Deleire 
(2000) suggest that the ADA reduced employment among disabled individuals.  This could stem from the 
firing costs associated with wrongful termination suits or from the costs of accommodating disabled 
workers, along with difficulties in reducing discrimination in hiring.  Both studies identify the effects of 
the ADA from time-series changes in the employment of the disabled (relative to the nondisabled).  With 
this identification strategy, however, different trends in the employment rates of these groups can 
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incorrectly be attributed to the effects of the ADA, and effects on the nondisabled could contaminate the 
results.  As in other areas of policy research, it is preferable – when possible – to examine sub-national 
variation in laws, using developments in the states that do not pass laws as controls for the states that do.   
Beegle and Stock (2003) also point out that when the ADA was enacted all but two states had laws 
barring discrimination against the disabled, although there was heterogeneity in these laws.  This raises 
questions about what is identified from time-series changes in employment of the disabled and 
nondisabled around the passage of the ADA.  On the other hand, Acemoglu and Angrist (2001) do report 
some confirming cross-state variation, in that the declines in employment of the disabled were larger in 
states with more ADA-related discrimination charges.  
Beegle and Stock (2003) estimate the effects of disability discrimination laws using variation in 
state laws barring discrimination against the disabled passed at different times between 1970 and 1990 
(prior to the ADA).  They do not find that these laws reduced employment of the disabled (nor do they 
find positive employment effects).  They also seek to identify the incremental effect of “reasonable 
accommodation” provisions in state laws and find none.  Kruse and Schur (2003) present additional 
evidence raising doubts about the conclusions from the time-series approach, showing that the answer 
differs depending on how disability is defined (as well as exploring some other issues regarding 
differential trends in employment of the disabled and nondisabled).  And Hotchkiss (2004) argues that the 
apparent decline in employment of the disabled does not reflect lower demand – due to increased barriers 
– but rather a decline in labor force participation among the disabled, mainly from (self) reclassification 
of nonparticipants as disabled.   
Jolls and Prescott (2005) explored these issues further, exploiting the variation in state laws when 
the ADA was passed to identify the “reasonable accommodation” and firing cost effects of the ADA.  For 
example, because of state variation, the ADA added the reasonable accommodation provision in some 
states but not others.  Their conclusions are a bit more mixed, finding that the reasonable accommodation 
provision does reduce employment, but only in the short term.5
5 They suggest that the effects of the reasonable accommodation provision may fade over time because of an 
  Thus, for the longer-term effects that are 
                                                 
                                                                                                                                                             
increased flow of disabled workers into the workplace as attitudes change, declining costs of accommodation due 
to technological change and judicial refinements of the ADA’s requirements, and more enforcement regarding 
discrimination in hiring based on accommodation costs sometime after the law was passed.   
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more relevant, their conclusions are similar to those of Beegle and Stock in suggesting that there is little 
evidence of adverse employment effects of the ADA. 
The study by Stock and Beegle (2004) is most closely related to ours.  This paper extends the 
analysis of the literature discussed above to the nondisabled, arguing – echoing the discussion in the 
Introduction – that older workers who are not disabled may receive greater protection from age 
discrimination when there are disability discrimination laws.  Moreover, they test for interactions between 
age and disability discrimination laws.  They find a positive interactive effect on employment of 
nondisabled workers aged 40-64, but a net effect of disability discrimination laws that is very small and 
statistically insignificant.       
There are limitations of this existing evidence in terms of the questions on which we 
focus.  First, the research on disability laws does not focus on those aged 65 and older,6 even 
though this is the group that is of considerable interest in terms of extending work lives, and for 
which disability rates are quite high (see Figure 1, discussed below)
6 Beegle and Stock (2003) use an age cutoff of 64, and Jolls and Prescott (2005) use a cutoff of 58. 
.  Thus, the existing research 
may speak more to the consequences of disability-related discrimination laws for those with 
“traditional” disabilities rather than to disabilities that are more the result of aging.  Second, the 
past research studied implementation of state discrimination protections prior to the federal 
ADA, or implementation of the ADA, rather than the more recent period when there is a federal 
law but some state laws are stronger.  Third, past research did not consider the types of variation 
in these laws that the proposed research will consider, although some of it addresses earlier 
heterogeneity in state disability discrimination laws.  Fourth, only one of the past studies 
considers a key issue we study – which is how these laws affect nondisabled older workers.  And 
fifth, the existing research does not address hiring per se, which we have suggested is important 
because of the role it can play in extending work lives of older workers, and because it is the 
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outcome that may be most likely to be deterred – albeit as an unintended consequence – by 
disability discrimination protections.       
 
 
III. Disability Discrimination Laws 
To study the effects of disability discrimination laws, we first needed to code up these laws.  To 
do this, we followed the procedure developed in Neumark and Song (2013) to code state age 
discrimination laws.  This required extensive background research on state statutes and their histories, 
culled from legal databases including Lexis-Nexis, Westlaw, and Hein Online, as well as many other 
sources.  The first step in assembling information on state disability discrimination laws was to identify 
the appropriate state statute, which can be complicated because the disability discrimination law can be 
listed under various sections of state law (a fair employment act, a separate disability discrimination act, 
etc.).  After the appropriate statute was identified, we traced the history of the statute using the legal 
databases to look for changes over time.  In some cases we had to look beyond the statutes to information 
from state agencies, case law, or other sources.   
Because it is complicated to read and interpret the law correctly based solely on statutes, we 
cross-checked our understanding of the statute with other legal references or treatises and additional 
sources of information on state laws.7  The other sources were also useful because of a further challenge 
in reading statutes.  In particular, one section may define what a discriminatory act is, while other 
provisions may be delegated to the Civil Rights Commission, or the remedies may be listed under a 
different section of the statute.    
                                                 
7 These included Beegle and Stock (2003), Buckley and Green (2011, 2009, 2008, 2006, 2002, 1997), Colker and 
Milani (2002), DRI (2011), Green (1992), Long (2004), Perry (2011), and a 50-state survey of discrimination laws 
at http://www.navexglobal.com/sites/default/files/uploads/lb_Descrimination-50States.pdf (viewed September 22, 
2014). 
 
To minimize inaccuracies, once all the necessary information was obtained from these sources, 
we attempted to compare and validate it using other sources.  If information obtained from different 
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sources coincided, we were confident that the information was correct.  In cases of what should be 
unambiguous information – in particular the employment level at or above which the law applies – we use 
the information from the statute regardless.  However, in cases of information that can be more easily 
misinterpreted from the statute, when we found discrepancies, we turned to state agencies or other sources 
for corroborating information.  We also examined case law, using the legal databases, to see if rulings 
established fixed features of the state laws that were not specified in the statute, such as damages allowed.   
As a result of these efforts, we were able to fill in all the information on these laws for our sample 
period.  The only possible exception is for damages.  In particular, if our information on damages came 
not from statutes but rather from case law or other sources, then we did not necessarily have an explicit 
“reading” on these damages in every year.  But since our other sources cover many years, the only 
variation we could miss was some short-term change between the level of damages we get from other 
sources.  We assume, though, that there is little or no such variation.        
There are three major ways in which state disability discrimination laws can be stronger than the 
federal ADA.  Two of these increase the number of individuals who are protected under state law, via the 
definition of disability, or the minimum firm size for disability discrimination laws to apply.  The third is 
more possible compensation for plaintiffs, through larger or no caps on compensatory and punitive 
damages, relative to the capped damages available under the ADA.  The first three columns of Table 1 
display the information on state disability discrimination laws, based on the preceding discussion.8 
                                                 
8 Additional information on these laws and how we determined their coding is provided in an on-line appendix (also 
available from the authors upon request). 
The minimum firm size for the ADA to apply is 15.  We create an indicator variable equal to one 
if the firm size minimum is lower than 10 (i.e., substantially lower than the ADA minimum), and zero 
otherwise.  When the firm size minimum is lower, more workers (and employers) are covered.   
Defining disability is of course more complicated than defining other protected groups, like age, 
race, and sex, and the definition of disability differs across states.  Most states adopt the same definition 
as the ADA, either explicitly or via case law.  Under the ADA, an individual can be deemed disabled by 
satisfying one of three criteria: 
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1. Has a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities;
9 Major life activities that have to be substantially limited were not defined in the ADA, but were defined by the 
EEOC as: “(i) Caring for oneself, performing manual tasks, seeing, hearing, eating, sleeping, walking, standing, 
sitting, reaching, lifting, bending, speaking, breathing, learning, reading, concentrating, thinking, communicating, 
interacting with others, and working; and (ii) the operation of a major bodily function…” (29 C.F.R. 1630.2 (i) 
and (ii)).  A list similar to this was included in the ADA Amendments Act (ADAAA), discussed in the next 
footnote. 
 
2. Has a record of such an impairment; 
3. Is regarded as having such an impairment. 
                                                 
Given that the definition of physical and mental impairment is quite broad, the “substantially 
limits” requirement can probably be thought of as the main criterion defining disability under the ADA 
and similar state laws.  Moreover, the “substantially limits” phrase has been interpreted by the courts as 
quite restrictive.  The U.S. Supreme Court, in the “Sutton Trilogy” of cases (Sutton v. United Airlines 
[119 S. Ct. 2139 (1999)]), Murphy v. United Parcel Service, Inc. [119 S. Ct. 2133 (1999)]), and 
Albertson's, Inc. v. Kirkingburg [119 S. Ct. 2162 (1999)]), deemed individuals to be not disabled if 
mitigating measures, such as glasses or medication, made the limiting features of the disability dormant.  
A U.S. Court of Appeals, 4th Circuit, decision also restricted episodic conditions, such as epilepsy, from 
being considered a disability in EEOC v. Sara Lee Corp., 237 F.3d 349 (4th Cir., 2001).10   
10 These decisions were reversed by the ADAAA, effective in 2009, which is beyond our sample period.  Under the 
ADAAA, states where the ADA’s definition of disability prevailed became more like those states using a medical 
impairment definition, discussed next.  In principle we could use data pre- and post-2009 for identifying 
information on this dimension of variation in disability discrimination laws, but the confounding effects of the 
Great Recession make this unlikely to be informative.   
Some states use a weaker criterion in this regard than the “substantially limits” requirement of the 
ADA under the first criterion above.  In two states this is done by the statutes substituting “materially 
limits” (MN) or just “limits” (CA) for “substantially limits,” with legal interpretations or statutes being 
explicit that this is a less stringent standard.11
11 See the on-line appendix (also available from the authors upon request) for more information on case law 
supporting these definitions as broader than the ADA. 
  Several states (CT, IL, NJ, NY, and WA) adopt an even 
laxer definition, considering an individual to be disabled if their impairment is medically diagnosed, 
regardless of whether the impairment substantially limits one or more major life activities.  Long (2004) 
argues, as seems quite reasonable, that these medical definitions broaden coverage relative to the ADA.  
To capture this variation, we create a dichotomous variable called “broader definition,” which equals one 
11 
 
for states with the medical definition of disability, and zero otherwise.  We also considered including 
California and Minnesota in the broader definition category with the medical definition states, but 
ultimately decided not to because the definition in these states seems much closer to the ADA definition.  
Nonetheless, we verified that results with this alternative classification were similar.    
Damages are likely to play a major role in the strength of discrimination laws, based in part on 
evidence from age discrimination laws (Neumark and Song, 2013).  The ADA caps the sum of 
compensatory and punitive damages per claimant based on firm size, as follows: 
1. 15-100 employees:    $50,000; 
2. 101-200 employees:  $100,000; 
3. 201-500 employees:  $200,000; 
4. 500 plus employees:  $300,000. 
Few states follow this exact schedule (AR, CO, DE, and MD from 2007 onward, SC, TX, WI 
prior to April 20, 2012).  Fifteen states allow larger potential damages, either through higher caps (AK, 
ME, NV, NC) or, more commonly, through no caps at all on both compensatory and punitive damages 
(CA, DC, HI, MA, MO, NJ, OH, OR , RI, VT, and WV).  We create a dichotomous variable called 
“larger damages,” which equals one for the 15 states where potential damages exceed those under the 
ADA, and zero otherwise.  Four states (FL, ID, KS, MN) have lower damage caps than the ADA, and two 
states (AL and MS) have no law (in which case we code the state as not having the stronger provision).  
There are 24 states with no punitive damages under state law, most of which allow uncapped 
compensatory damages. We do not include these states in the larger damages category because 
compensatory damages require documentation and in many cases seem unlikely to be as large; an 
example might be medical bills if an employee was terminated unjustly, and dropped from a health 
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insurance plan.  Thus, punitive damages are likely more the driver of large judgments.
                                                 
12 For reasons explained below, some of our analyses incorporate information on two features of state age 
discrimination laws – larger damages, and the firm-size cut-off – in some of our analyses.  This information (from 
Neumark and Song, 2013) is listed in the last two columns of Table 1.  As the table shows, firm-size minimums 
are similar for disability and age discrimination laws, but there are nine states that have a different minimum (AL, 
AR, DE, GA, KY, IN, LA, NE, and SD). With regard to damages, we focus on whether compensatory or punitive 
damages are allowed, which they are not under federal age discrimination law (the ADEA).  Some states require 
proof of intent to discriminate in order for compensatory or punitive damages to be awarded, whereas others 
require “willful” violation.  Because the federal law allows additional liquidated, nonpunitive damages (double 
back pay and benefits) when there is “willful” violation, the question of whether the state requires intent or willful 
violation may seem to be potentially relevant in deciding whether a state law offers greater protection.  However, 
willful violation is a much stricter standard than intent (Moberly, 1994).  Moreover, compensatory or punitive 
damages are almost certainly greater than liquidated damages, and they can be much greater.  As a consequence, a 
state law that provides compensatory or punitive damages, whether or not this requires proof of intent or willful 
violation, clearly entails stronger remedies than the federal law, so our classification captures whether either is 
allowed. 
IV. Labor Market Data 
Health and Retirement Study (HRS) Data 
The part of our analysis that focuses exclusively on older workers uses the Health and Retirement 
Study (HRS), a large, longitudinal dataset that covers older individuals biennially starting in 1992.  We 
use data from nine waves from 1992 through 2008, avoiding the period of the Great Recession by ending 
the sample in 2008.  The initial HRS cohorts were born from 1931 to 1941, but other cohorts have been 
added to the study, so that currently the oldest cohort in the HRS was born in 1924 and the youngest 
cohort was born in 1955.  In addition, although the sampling frame for the HRS depends on birth year, 
spouses of the respondents are also included, with birth years that range from 1890 to 1983.  We restrict 
our data (for almost all of our analyses) to respondents aged 53 to 69, and avoid spouses outside these age 
ranges who can be highly nonrepresentative of their ages.13
13 We impose the minimum wage restriction of 53 because members of the HRS initial cohort were between age 
51and 61 when they were first interviewed in 1992.  We can only observe their hiring outcomes starting with the 
second wave, which is two years later.  
  We study men only to avoid complications 
from the very different labor force participation patterns of men and women in the covered cohorts.  The 
HRS oversamples Hispanic, blacks, and residents of Florida, and since much of our analysis can be 
viewed as descriptive, we use sampling weights to strive for representativeness.   
The dependent variable of interest is hiring.  To measure this as accurately as possible, we use 
more information than simply employment status and other information about the job at each HRS 
interview, by using responses to interview questions that provide information on labor market transitions 
13 
 
between the interviews, which we refer to as “inter-wave” information.  Specifically, employment 
transitions from self-employed or not working to employed are coded as hires, as are transitions from 
employed at wave t-2 to working for a different employer at wave t (HRS waves are two years apart).  
Respondents who make transitions from nonemployment at wave t-2 to self-employed or nonemployment 
at wave t are coded as hires if they report working for a wage or salary between waves.  Otherwise 
respondents are coded as nonhires.14
14 In some cases, we made our best determination as to whether there was an inter-wave hire even when the 
information available is not completely decisive.  Specifically, the questions on work between waves were not 
asked for respondents who went from self-employed to not employed or self-employed, if they do not know when 
they stopped the initial self-employed job; we assumed these individuals were not hired between waves.  Also, 
many observations are missing the inter-wave information and classified as “inapplicable or partial interview” in 
the codebook.  For cases with missing data and transitions from wave t-2 to t between disabled, retired, and not in 
the labor force (based on the RAND HRS labor force status code), we assumed no hire occurred.   
  The control variables we include are described in the notes to the 
tables and figures discussed below.   
                                                 
Although we have coded hiring for every observation for which it is possible, in the paper we 
focus attention on those initially nonemployed (in period t-2), asking if they were hired as of period t.  We 
do this because a job-to-job transitions are harder to interpret.  They capture new hiring, of course.  But 
they can also capture adverse outcomes at the previous job, whereas we can assume that nonemployed 
workers who become employed were definitely looking to get hired.  Thus, we think that the estimated 
effects of disability discrimination laws on hiring of the previously nonemployed better isolates the 
effects of these laws on hiring.  Nonetheless, we have examined all of the analyses we report in this paper 
using all hiring instead.  In general, qualitative conclusions about the effects of disability discrimination 
laws are unchanged; these results are available from the authors upon request. 
Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP) Data 
We also use SIPP data so that we can look at a larger age range, in part to exploit differences 
between younger and older workers to learn more about the potential effects of disability discrimination 
laws, as explained in the next section.  To correspond to the years covered by the HRS, we use data from 
the 1992, 1993, 1996, 2001, and 2004 SIPP panels; the last panel extends into 2008.   
We exploit the longitudinal nature of the data to construct person-month hiring data.  We 
implement a similar method as we do with HRS where our hiring measure is mainly based on 
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respondents’ employment status and the information on whether a worker reported changing employer 
and when they began working for the new employer.  Although respondents report their employment 
status at both a weekly and monthly frequency, the information on when they began working for the new 
employer is only available at the monthly level.  Thus, our hiring measure is at the monthly level.  
Paralleling our decision regarding the HRS, we did not use the most recent SIPP 2008 panel to avoid the 
Great Recession.  We also restrict our sample to males, for reasons described earlier, and use sampling 
weights since the SIPP oversamples from high poverty areas.   
To be more specific, to measure hiring we use the monthly employment status data to categorize 
respondents as employed, self-employed, or not working.  If respondents report having a job for at least 
one week during the reference month, we record them as employed.  If they report having a job for at 
least one week during the reference month and own their own business, we define them to be self-
employed.  If they report having no job, we define them to be not working.  If they make a transition from 
self-employed or not working at t-1 to employed at t (which here denotes a monthly frequency), we code 
them as hired.  If they are employed at t-1 and employed at t and report that they started their job at t, then 
we code them as hired at t.  As for the HRS analysis, we focus on the sample not employed at period t-1, 
and estimate models for whether these respondents were hired as of period t.15 
                                                 
15 There is other information that could in principle be used to identify hiring, in particular the unique job 
identification number across waves.  However, we do not use this information due to reported inconsistency in 
implementation (Stinson, 2003). 
The SIPP interviews respondents every four months and reports about their previous four months.  
A well-known limitation of the SIPP is a strong tendency for individuals to report the same value within a 
four-month interview period.  This is called seam bias, which exaggerates the changes across waves and 
smooths out the changes within each four-month reference period (Ham et al., 2011).  To address this 
seam bias, we include an indicator for being on a seam between two interview waves.  Other control 
variables we include are described in the notes to the tables and figures discussed below.   
Disability Definitions 
We focus more of our results on self-reported, work-impairing disabilities.  In the HRS, the 
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disability definition is based on the question “Do you have any impairment or health problem that limits 
the kind or amount of paid work you can do?”  In the SIPP, the disability definition is based on the 
question “[Do you] have a physical, mental, or other health condition that limits the kind or amount of 
work [you] can do?”16
                                                 
16 This disability variable in the SIPP is asked only for individuals who are 69 years or younger, so we restrict the 
SIPP sample to 15 to 69 years of age. 
  These questions are, fortuitously, very similar.   
We also examine key results (and report additional results in an appendix available upon request) 
using an alternative definition based on self-reported fair or bad health (with the additional options being 
good, very good, or excellent).  These are not identical.  In the HRS data about 59 percent of those who 
report a work-limiting disability report that they are in fair or bad health, and about 64 percent of those 
who report fair or bad health also report a work-limiting disability.  However, Appendix Table A1 shows 
that, in the HRS data, these two measures have similar relationships with difficulties in activities and 
instrumental activities, with functional limitations, and with doctor-diagnosed medical problems.   
V. Empirical Analysis 
We study the effects of disability discrimination laws on hiring in a number of ways.  For the 
most part, we rely on cross-state variation in the strength of state disability discrimination laws to try to 
assess how stronger laws affect hiring, because there are virtually no changes in these laws during the 
periods we study.  We do, nonetheless, present a quite rich analysis that reveals differences in hiring rates 
by single-year age cells, for both the nondisabled and the disabled, in states with stronger and weaker 
disability discrimination laws along each of the dimensions discussed earlier and categorized in Table 1.     
To try to get more compelling identification for some of our analyses, we also estimate 
difference-in-differences models.  In particular, one of the key questions we study is the effect of 
disability discrimination protections on the hiring of nondisabled older workers, who we speculated could 
be adversely affected because of expectations of a reasonable probability that such workers will develop a 
disability and become protected by disability discrimination laws.  Given that there is a rather sharp rise 
in disability rates (as measured in the SIPP – see Figure 1 discussed below) at or soon after age 50, we 
construct difference-in-differences estimates for the effects of disability discrimination laws on hiring of 
16 
 
nondisabled workers over and under cutoffs near 50.  The idea is that differences in hiring rates for those 
who are nondisabled and younger than age 50 (or similar thresholds) capture state differences arising 
from factors unrelated to state disability discrimination laws and hence can control for these factors, so 
that differences associated with these laws for those who are nondisabled and older than age 50 relative to 
those who are nondisabled and younger than are 50 are more likely to reflect the actual effects of these 
laws.  Of course this is not completely clean because even younger nondisabled workers could, in 
principle, be affected by disability discrimination laws.  And it would not make any sense to implement 
this strategy for the disabled because hiring of the disabled of all ages could be affected by disability 
discrimination laws.  
Descriptive Statistics 
Figure 1 shows self-reported, work-impairing disability rates by age in the HRS and SIPP data.  
In the HRS data, which cover a narrow age range, these rates rise largely monotonically with age, from 
around 15 percent near age 55 to 25 percent at age 65-70.17  In the SIPP data, the larger age range reveals 
more nonlinearity in this relationship.  The disability rates in the range covered by the HRS are quite 
similar, but the figure reveals quite low and stable disability rates through about age 40, in the 5-8 percent 
range, a slight steepening during the 40s, and then fairly sharp increases beginning in the 50s.18  This age 
pattern is the basis for the difference-in-differences approach mentioned above.   
                                                 
17 In the following analyses we restrict the HRS sample to be no older than 69, to line up with the oldest age for 
which this disability question is asked in the SIPP.  In this figure, though, we show disability rates through age 80.   
18 The slight dip after age 60 may be related to the relationship between whether one works and how one answers 
this question.   
Table 2 reports descriptive statistics – means and standard errors of means – for the variables 
used in our analysis, beginning with the computed hiring rate and then the controls.  For the SIPP, we 
report these for both the full sample and those aged 53-69, which provides a better comparison for the 
ages common to the SIPP and the HRS for which we also have the disability question.   
Comparing the data sets shows that the measured hiring rate is much higher in the HRS, 
presumably because of the biennial frequency used for the HRS as opposed to the monthly frequency 
used for the SIPP.  The descriptive statistics for the control variables are fairly comparable in the two 
datasets, for the same age ranges.   
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Hiring Rates by Age and Disability Discrimination Laws 
We next present a set of figures (Figures 2 and 3) that provide information on hiring rates by age.  
Figure 2 covers the HRS, and Figure 3 covers the SIPP.  In each figure we show three panels, each with 
two graphs – one for the nondisabled, and one for the disabled.  Each of these panels displays the hiring 
rates, for single-year age cells, for states with a stronger disability discrimination law provision and states 
without that stronger provision (or no laws).  The three panels for each data set present results, 
respectively, based on the broader definition of disability, larger damages, and a lower minimum firm-
size cutoff for the law to apply.   
The estimates displayed in the graphs come from a probit model for the hiring outcome on the 
controls listed in the notes to the figures, a set of dummies for every age group, and a full set of 
interactions between these age dummy variables and a dummy variable for the stronger disability 
discrimination protection under consideration.19  Using the probit estimates, we compute the predicted 
hiring probability at each age, for each set of states (with and without the stronger provision), setting the 
other controls at their sample means.  Thus, these figures show the difference in hiring rates by age for 
otherwise identical workers (evaluated at the sample means), based on whether that worker resides in a 
state with the stronger disability discrimination protection or not.   
                                                 
19 Note that we do not control for the unemployment rate or another aggregate labor market indicator, which would 
be endogenous with respect to hiring (especially of the large nondisabled workforce).   
Figure 2, Panel A, displays results for the HRS data, focusing on the distinction between states 
with or without the broader definition of disability than the ADA.  For the nondisabled, in the left-hand 
graph, it appears that hiring rates are for the most part lower in states that use the broader definition.  For 
ages 58 to 69 the hiring rate in these states is always below or about equal to the hiring rate in the states 
that do not use the broader definition.  This is consistent with the conjecture that stronger disability 
discrimination laws can deter hiring of older nondisabled workers.  For the disabled, in the right-hand 
graph, the evidence looks similar and a bit more pronounced, suggesting that stronger protections for 
disabled older workers can lower their hiring rate.    
Figure 2, Panels B and C, present similar analyses, but for larger damages (Panel B) and a lower 
firm-size cutoff (Panel C).  In these figures there is much less clear evidence of a systematic relationship 
between stronger state laws and hiring of older workers.  In the states with larger damages, the hiring rate 
of the nondisabled is generally lower for those in their 60s, but the difference appears small.  And for the 
disabled there is no clear indication.20  For the lower firm-size cutoff, in Figure 2, Panel C, there is no 
clear evidence of a difference in hiring rates for either the nondisabled or the disabled.  
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20 We experimented with distinguishing between states with larger damages than the ADA but damages that are still 
capped, and states with uncapped damages (see Table 1).  However, there were no distinct differences between 
these two groups of states, perhaps in part because there are only four uncapped states and two of them (Alaska 
and Maine) have very small populations.  Thus, all results reported in the paper groups these two sets of states 
together as having larger damages than the ADA.   
Table 3 provides more succinct summary information from these figures, in the columns labeled 
“HRS.”  In particular, for different age ranges we report – based on the estimates that underlie Figure 2 – 
the average difference in hiring rates between states with and without the stronger provision, the 
percentage of those estimates that are positive, and the p-value for the joint test that the estimated 
differences in that age range are equal to zero.   
For example, recall that Figure 2, Panel A, indicated that hiring rates for the nondisabled were, at 
older ages, lower in states using the broader definition of disability.  This is reflected most strongly in the 
information reported in the fifth row in column (1), for the 62-69 age range.  Here we see that, on 
average, the difference in the estimated hiring rates was −0.023; as the figure shows, hiring rates at these 
ages are lower for states using the broader definition, hence the negative sign.  The majority of the 
estimates are negative (37.5 percent are positive), as the figure also shows.  However, and something we 
cannot see in the figure, the hiring rate differences over this age range are not statistically significant; the 
p-value from the joint test that the differences in this age range are all zero is 0.694.   
The remaining information in columns (1) and (2) reports similar information for the disabled as 
well, and for slightly different age ranges that can be better aligned with the SIPP data.  Overall, while the 
point estimates are consistent with the broader definition of disability  lowering hiring rates for older 
disabled and nondisabled workers (for age ranges that encompass the 60s), the differences are not 
statistically significant.21   
21 Moreover, these joint tests for the age ranges reported in Table 3 do not appear to mask any consistent evidence of 
significant effects one way or the other for other age ranges (such as smaller ranges within those reported in the 
table).  There is only a smattering of significant coefficient estimates on the age × law interactions at isolated 
single-year ages.    
The information in columns (5)-(6) and (9)-(10) summarizes the graphs for the other two 
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provisions of state disability discrimination laws (from Panels B and C of Figure 2).  We saw that those 
graphs gave weaker indications of differences in hiring rates at older ages associated with stronger state 
disability discrimination laws, and that is reflected in these columns.  None of the estimated differentials 
for the age ranges considered in this table are jointly significant, although for larger damages the 
estimated differentials for all three of the older age ranges for nondisabled workers are negative.   
Figure 3 presents results for the SIPP data, which have the advantage of covering a broader age 
range.  Panel A focuses on the distinction between states with or without the broader definition of 
disability than the ADA.  Curiously, for the same age ranges covered by the HRS, the evidence is 
different, as there is no clear indication that hiring rates for the nondisabled older workers are lower in 
states that use the broader definition, and for the disabled there is no apparent difference at any ages.  This 
is reflected, for example, in the fifth row (for ages 62-69) of columns (3) and (4) of Table 3, where we see 
that the average differences in hiring rates are much smaller than those for the same age ranges in 
columns (1) and (2), and effectively zero.  Nonetheless, in the last two rows of the table, for the 53-61 and 
53-69 age ranges, for both the broader definition of disability and larger damages the estimates are 
negative and statistically significant.  The estimated differences are very small – in the −0.001 to −0.003 – 
but these are relative to a SIPP hiring rate for 53-69 year-olds of 0.019, so that the midrange (−0.002) 
represents about a 10-percent lower hiring rate.  On the other hand, the reported percentages of positive 
estimates is often quite close to 50 percent, suggesting this evidence is not strongly indicative of an effect 
in one direction.       
Panel A of Figure 3 indicates evidence of a systematic difference for younger ages, where the 
hiring for the nondisabled tends to be lower in the states that use the broader definition of disability – for 
most ages up to the late 40s.  This is reflected in the top rows of columns (3) and (4) of Table 3, where for 
the nondisabled the average estimated differences in hiring rates between states that use the broader 
definition and those that do not are negative for ages 20-29, 30-39, and 40-49 – and in all cases the 
estimates are statistically significant.22
22 Note also that similar differences to those in the HRS data are statistically significant in the SIPP data because of 
far larger samples.   
  These estimates range from −0.011 to −0.024 – estimates that are 
much larger than for the older ranges.  (These are, though, relative to a much higher hiring rage [about 
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0.12, as shown in Figure 3], and hence are more similar in terms of relative effects.)  For the disabled, 
though, there are no clear differences in hiring rates in the SIPP at young ages based on the definition of 
disability.  Finally, the differences in hiring rates for older disabled workers are very small and not in a 
consistent direction, although some of these sets of coefficients are statistically significant.   
Figure 3, Panel B, studies larger damages in the SIPP data.  In the left-hand panel, there is less 
clear evidence of lower hiring for the younger nondisabled in states with stronger laws. See also column 
(7) of Table 3, where the point estimates are smaller in absolute value and not significant, compared to 
column (3).  In the right-hand panel, there is evidence of higher hiring of the disabled at many ages – 
most pronounced at younger ages.  As Table 3,  column (8) shows, though, the estimated differences at 
younger ages are small except for ages 20-29, and generally not statistically significant.  Finally, Figure 3, 
Panel C, reports the results for the lower firm-size minimum, which does not appear to be systematically 
associated with differential hiring.    
To summarize to this point, there is some evidence from the HRS that stronger disability 
discrimination protections – in terms of a broader definition of disability – reduce hiring of both 
nondisabled and disabled older workers, and the same is true for the effect of larger damages on older, 
nondisabled workers.  However, this evidence is not statistically significant.  The point estimates for the 
disabled, with the broader definition, are consistent with this stronger disability discrimination protection 
deterring their hiring, which we might expect as a direct implication of these protections increasing the 
cost of employing or of terminating a disabled worker.  And the point estimates for the nondisabled are 
consistent with stronger protections also deterring hiring of nondisabled older workers, perhaps because 
employers regard it as relatively likely that these workers will become disabled and fall under these 
stronger disability discrimination protections.   
The most consistent evidence we could find in the SIPP would be similar lower hiring rates of 
nondisabled and disabled older workers in states with stronger protections, and perhaps also lower hiring 
rates of disabled younger workers in states with stronger protections.  In contrast, we would not expect 
lower hiring rates for nondisabled younger workers, because employers should regard them as relatively 
unlikely to become disabled.   
However, the results from the SIPP only partly conform to this.  The SIPP results do provide 
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some evidence of lower hiring rates for nondisabled older workers in states with stronger protections – in 
terms of a broader definition of disability, and larger damages – although this evidence is best regarded as 
weak.  More unexpectedly, the estimates indicate lower hiring rates for nondisabled younger workers in 
these states, especially for the broader definition of disability.  It is conceivable that stronger disability 
discrimination laws do more to deter hiring of disabled younger workers than to deter hiring of disabled 
older workers, because younger workers may be more likely to stay with the employer a long time, and 
hence impose higher accommodation costs.  But there is no clear reason that stronger protections should 
do more to deter hiring of younger nondisabled workers.   
To see whether the results are sensitive to the definition of disability, in Table 4 we repeat the 
analysis – but using a different definition of disability, one based on self-reported fair or bad health (the 
other choices respondents can report are good, very good, or excellent).  This kind of disability measure 
has the potential advantage of not being tied to whether one is working, although the potential 
disadvantage is that it does not refer specifically to whether a disability or medical condition limits work.   
The results in Table 4 are in many respects qualitatively similar to those in Table 3.23  Turning to 
the key results in the HRS data – for older, nondisabled workers – the evidence points to lower hiring 
when there are stronger protections in the form of a broader definition of disability or larger damages.  In 
columns (1) and (5) all six of the estimates are consistently negative, and the shares positive are low, 
although again none of the estimates is statistically significant.  For the SIPP data, in columns (3) and (7), 
the evidence is not as clear.  The estimates are similar to those in Table 3, but often smaller in absolute 
value, and less consistently negative.  For younger workers in the SIPP data, there is a bit less evidence 
that stronger state disability discrimination laws reduce employment of nondisabled younger workers 
(e.g., the smaller estimates for 20-29, 30-39, and especially 40-49 year-olds in column (7), and the fact 
that all of the estimates for the nondisabled in these age groups are less negative in Table 4 than in Table 
3).  Overall, though, there are not systematic differences using the alternative disability measure.   
                                                 
23 The corresponding figures are available in an appendix available from the authors upon request.   
An Difference-in-differences Estimates of the Effects of State Disability Discrimination Laws on Hiring of 
Older Workers  
The SIPP sometimes pointing to lower hiring rates of younger, nondisabled workers in states with 
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stronger protections is puzzling.  One interpretation is that this is not causal, but instead reflects 
unmeasured factors that influence hiring of younger nondisabled workers (which of course is most 
younger workers) and that are correlated with disability discrimination protections.  This helps motivate 
the final type of analysis we do, which is the difference-in-differences estimation described above that 
estimates the effect of stronger disability discrimination protection on nondisabled workers from the 
relative effects of these protections on older versus younger nondisabled workers, effectively using the 
younger workers to control for other influences on hiring that are correlated with disability discrimination 
laws.  Note that it only makes sense to do this for the nondisabled, since we would expect a direct effect 
of disability discrimination laws on younger disabled workers (and as noted above, they might even be 
stronger).   
Thus, in Table 5 we report estimates from difference-in-differences specifications.  These are 
based on linear probability models of hiring to avoid the complications from evaluating and reporting 
interaction coefficients from probit models.  The form of the equations we estimate is as follows:  
Hist = α + LAWs⋅OLDistβ + Xistδ + ∑aAaωa + ∑sSsθs + ∑tTtρt + εist.  
The models include the individual-level (X) and other controls (A, for single-year age dummy 
variables) as before, with two differences.  First, the models include fixed state effects (S) in addition to 
the fixed year effects (T).  And second, rather than including interactions between all of the single-year 
age dummy variables and the indicator for a stronger state disability discrimination protection (LAW),24
24 We omit a time subscript because there are virtually no changes in the laws in our sample period, as noted earlier.   
 a 
simple interaction between the latter indicator and a dummy variable for older workers is included – using 
alternatively thresholds of 50, 55, and 60 (OLD).  The state fixed effects subsume main effects of the 
disability discrimination law dummy variables, capturing differences among states in hiring rates of 
younger workers.25
25 This is not exactly true since as Table 1 shows there is one change, in Washington, in the definition of disability.  
So for specifications involving the definition of disability the main effect is included, although not reported in the 
table because we do not view it as reliable. 
  The LAW × OLD interactions then capture the differential effects of features of state 
disability discrimination protections on older versus younger workers.  In some specifications we include 
interactions with a single dummy variable for one feature of the disability discrimination law, and in 
others we include these interactions for all three of these simultaneously.  Under the assumption that 
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variation across states for younger workers does not reflect the effects of these protections, these LAW × 
OLD interactions capture the effects of the disability protections on older workers.   
We use the SIPP data for this analysis because we need the younger workers as controls.  We 
have an indication of what to expect from the earlier analysis of the SIPP data.  For example,  Panel A of 
Figure 3 (and column (3) of Table 3) suggested that stronger disability discrimination protections – in the 
form of a broader definition or larger damages – were associated with lower hiring of younger 
nondisabled workers, but less so for older nondisabled workers, at least using the work-limiting measure 
of disability.  Thus, when we look at effects on older workers relative to younger workers, we should find 
positive effects. 
The difference-in-differences estimates are reported in Table 5.  In columns (1)-(3) we introduce 
each of our stronger features of state disability discrimination laws one at a time, and then in column (4) 
we introduce all three simultaneously.  The estimates paint a rather clear picture.  Regardless of what age 
threshold we use, state disability discrimination laws that use the broader definition of disability, and in 
some cases also those with larger damages, appear to raise, rather than to lower, hiring of nondisabled 
older workers.  For the broader definition of disability this is true for each age threshold in column (1), 
and also for the 55 age threshold in column (4) where we use a more demanding specification that 
estimates the effect of the broader definition, larger damages, and a lower firm-size cutoff simultaneously.  
And the estimates are sizable, in the range of a 0.014 higher hiring rate.  We find some similar evidence 
for state laws with larger damages, in two cases (column [2], for the age 50 and age 55 thresholds).  We 
find no such evidence for a lower firm-size cutoff.   
If this evidence implies that stronger disability discrimination protections increase hiring of 
nondisabled older workers, it is inconsistent with one of the conjectures with which we began – that such 
laws could deter hiring of older, nondisabled workers because employers fear they will become disabled 
and fall under these stronger protections.  The evidence points in the opposite direction from this 
conjecture.  A positive effect of stronger disability protections on the hiring of older nondisabled workers 
might seem counterintuitive.  But the disability reflected in self reports need not be the same as the 
disabilities or characteristics of older workers that employers might perceive as making older workers 
likely to later qualify for protections under disability discrimination laws.  Hence the increase in hiring of 
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those who do not self-report as disabled might still come among those with disabilities that, because of 
stronger disability discrimination protections, boost hiring of older workers with these disabilities.   
To try to assess whether this result is sensitive to the definition of disability, in columns (1)-(4) of 
Table 6 we repeat this analysis – but using the different definition of disability based on self-reported fair 
or bad health.  Fair or bad health could be more likely to be reflected in an employer’s perception of the 
likelihood of future disabilities of older workers.  The results, reported in Table 6, indicate that we no 
longer find significant positive effects of the stronger  state laws with broader definitions of disability on 
the hiring or nondisabled older workers; the estimates are still positive, but smaller than in Table 4 and no 
longer statistically significant.   
Thus, with this alternative definition of disability, the counterintuitive finding of strong disability 
discrimination protections helping nondisabled older workers is no longer present.  The most significant 
and broader point, however, is that we find no evidence – in either analysis – of adverse effects of 
disability discrimination laws on older workers.  Finally, note that some of earlier results using only 
cross-state variation (in Tables 3 and 4) gave some indication that stronger disability discrimination 
protections reduce hiring or older nondisabled workers.  The difference-in-differences analysis, in 
contrast, gives no such indication.       
One possible confounder is that age discrimination laws may affect outcomes for older and 
younger workers, and also be correlated with disability discrimination laws (see Table 1).  To see whether 
this affects the conclusions from our difference-in-differences analysis, columns (5)-(8) of Tables 5 and 6 
add interactions between our older worker thresholds and the two indicators of stronger age 
discrimination laws that were significant in the results reported in Neumark and Song (2013) – larger 
damages and a firm-size minimum of fewer than 10 employees.26  The estimates for the effects of 
disability discrimination laws are similar in magnitude, indicating that they are robust to controlling 
separately for state age discrimination protections.  
                                                 
26 There are a few more changes in age discrimination laws over the sample period, but still not enough to reliably 




Finally, we have also re-estimated these models dropping 40-49 year-olds, to get a cleaner 
distinction between older ages at which disability is rising and younger ages when it is not (see Figure 1).   




We explore the effects of disability discrimination laws on hiring of older workers.  These laws 
are, of course, supposed to help disabled workers find employment and remain employed, but there is a 
long-standing concern in the discrimination literature that antidiscrimination laws can have unintended, 
adverse effects on hiring by raising the cost of terminations and – in the specific case of disability 
discrimination laws – by raising the cost of employment because of the need to accommodate disabled 
workers.  This unintended adverse effect could arise for disabled workers of any age, and indeed, could be 
stronger for younger disabled workers because of longer projected tenure with an employer.  The new 
hypothesis we also explore in this paper – which has potentially larger implications for the challenge of 
extending work lives – is that disability discrimination laws can even deter hiring of older nondisabled 
workers, because the probability of developing a work-related disability is fairly high for older workers.   
There is very little research on whether stronger antidiscrimination laws reduce hiring; the 
findings are inconsistent, and are limited to age discrimination laws.  (There are, in contrast, a number of 
studies of the effects of antidiscrimination laws on employment.)  We argue if there is an adverse effect of 
discrimination protections on hiring, it is most likely to arise for disability discrimination laws, because 
the accommodation requirements of disability laws can imply higher costs, and there are weaker defenses 
available to employers.   
We use state variation in disability discrimination protections, which can strengthen the coverage 
of these laws by using a broader definition of disability than the ADA or applying to smaller firms, or can 
entail higher costs of discrimination via larger damages.   
The evidence is somewhat nuanced and not always consistent across datasets, but does appear to 
support some conclusions.  First, our best evidence suggests that stronger state disability discrimination 
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laws do not lower the hiring of nondisabled older workers, using either of two definitions of disability.  
And when we use a work-limiting measure of disability, we find some evidence that stronger disability 
discrimination laws based on using the broader definition of disability or larger damagers may boost their 
hiring.  This evidence comes from difference-in-differences specifications that compare differences across 
states with stronger and weaker disability discrimination protections – estimating the effects for older 
nondisabled workers (who have high probabilities of becoming disabled) relative to younger nondisabled 
workers (for whom these probabilities are low).  All of this evidence is inconsistent with the conjecture 
that such laws deter hiring of older, nondisabled workers because employers fear they will become 
disabled and fall under these stronger protections.   
Evidence from cross-state variation in laws and hiring rates – which could be less likely to reflect 
causal effects – suggests that stronger state disability protections may reduce hiring of older, nondisabled 
workers, more consistent with this conjecture.  However, this evidence on its own is not statistically or 
substantively strong, and it is contradicted by the difference-in-differences analysis using the SIPP.  And 
there is no indication that stronger disability discrimination laws deter hiring of disabled workers.       
Overall, we read the evidence as providing little or no evidence of adverse effects of disability 
discrimination laws on older workers – either from weaker tests we can use to study the disabled, or the 
more-compelling difference-in-differences tests we can use to study the nondisabled.  Moreover, the latter 
evidence, which we view as most compelling, sometimes points to positive effects.      
In our view, these results may also have more general implications for thinking about 
antidiscrimination laws.  We have argued that there are unusual features of disability discrimination laws 
that make the unintended consequence of deterring hiring – in this case, for older workers – more likely.  
In that sense, this paper can be interpreted as a particularly informative test of the proposition that 
discrimination laws may end up reducing hiring of protected groups.  That is, one might think that if labor 
economists were ever going to find evidence that a discrimination protection deters hiring, it would be for 
disability discrimination laws owing to the potential higher cost of employing this group, which is in 
addition to the potential higher termination costs that any antidiscrimination law can pose.  Moreover, it 
might be strongest for nondisabled older workers for whom employers could fear future costs from 
disability, but who are not yet protected by disability discrimination laws.  By the same token, the fact 
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that we do not find such evidence could be viewed as mitigating the concern that antidiscrimination laws 
have the unintended consequence of deterring hiring from the groups protected by these laws.   
On the other hand, one potential offset to this argument is that the potentially higher termination 
costs that discrimination protections generate may be less relevant for older workers who are unlikely to 
have long tenure with the employer anyway.  This may explain why it was only in the period after the 
Great Recession that Neumark and Button (2014) found evidence that stronger age discrimination laws 
reduced hiring of older workers; in a period of extreme uncertainty about product and hence labor 
demand, employers may have been more concerned that they would want to terminate an older worker 
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Figure 1: Disability by Age in HRS (Left) and SIPP (Right) Data 
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Notes: The disability rates are based on raw data, without adjustment.  In the HRS, the disability definition is based on the question “Do you have any 
impairment or health problem that limits the kind or amount of paid work you can do?”  In the SIPP, the disability definition is based on the question “[Do 
you] have a physical, mental, or other health condition that limits the kind or amount of work [you] can do?  In the SIPP, this question is asked only for 





Figure 2: HRS Hiring Rates (from Nonemployment) Using Inter-Wave Information,  
for Nondisabled and Disabled 
 
A. By Definition of Disability under Disability Discrimination Laws 










50 55 60 65 70
Age










50 55 60 65 70
Age
Regular Definition Broader Definition
 
B. By Damages under Disability Discrimination Laws 
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C. By Firm-Size Minimum under Disability Discrimination Laws 
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Notes: We use 1992-2008 HRS data for this analysis.  HRS restricted data with state identifiers are used.  The sample period for this analysis is 
1992 through 2008.  We restrict the sample to males who are 53 to 69 and use person-level HRS sampling weights.  We use probit models to 
calculate the predicted hiring probability for each age group conditional on respondents being not working at t-1.  The models are estimated 
separately for the nondisabled and the disabled.  Each specification includes year fixed effects, single-year age dummy variables, and interactions 
between these age dummy variables and a dummy variable for the stronger disability discrimination protection indicated in the graph.  The 
individual-level controls include urban-rural status, race, marital status, education level.  Urban-rural status includes urban, suburban, or ex-urban 
residence; race includes white, black, and other; marital status includes married and married with spouse absent, partnered, separated/divorced/ 
widowed, and never married; education includes less than high school, GED or high school graduate, some college, and college and above.  The 
predicted probability of hiring at each age is evaluated at the sample means of the controls.  See the text and Table 1 for discussion and 






Figure 3: SIPP Hiring Rates (from Nonemployment), for Nondisabled and Disabled 
A. By Definition of Disability under Disability Discrimination Laws 
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B. By Damages under Disability Discrimination Laws 
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C. By Firm-Size Minimum under Disability Discrimination Laws 
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Notes: We use SIPP 1992, 1993, 1996, 2001, and 2004 for this analysis, so the sample period for this analysis is October, 1991 through 
December, 2007.  We use probit models to calculate the predicted hiring probability for each age group conditional on respondents being 
not working at t-1.  The models are estimated separately for the nondisabled and the disabled.  We restrict the sample to adult males who 
are 15 or older and use person-level SIPP sampling weights.  Each specification includes year fixed effects, single-year age dummy 
variables, and interactions between these age dummy variables and a dummy variable for the stronger disability discrimination 
protection indicated in the graph.  The individual level controls include education, marital status, SMSA status, and race.  Education 
includes high school graduate, some college, and college; marital status includes married, widowed, divorced; SMSA status includes 
metropolitan, and not-identified; race includes black, Asian, or other.  All analyses include a dummy variable whether the hiring 
occurred during the last month of each wave to control for the seam bias.  The predicted probability of hiring at each age is evaluated at 
the sample means of the controls.  The disability definition is based on self-reported variable “[Do you] have a physical, mental, or other 
health condition that limits the kind or amount of work [you] can do?”  This question is asked only for those 69 years or younger.  See 
the text and Table 1 for discussion and classification of states by characteristics of disability discrimination laws.  See the notes to Figure 
1 for the definition of disability in the SIPP. 
 
 
Table 1: State Disability and Age Discrimination Laws, 2008 
 Disability discrimination laws Age discrimination laws 
Minimum firm size 
Broader definition 




than ADEA State 
Alabama No law No law No law 20 No 
Alaska 1 No Yes 1 Yes 
Arizona 15 No No (no punitive) 15 No 
Arkansas 9 No No (same as ADA) No law No law 
California 5 No (“limits” only, 
effective 2001) 
Yes (uncapped) 5 Yes 
Colorado 1 No No (same as ADA) 1 No 
Connecticut 3 Yes No (no punitive) 3 No 
Delaware 15 No No (same as ADA) 4 Yes 
D.C. 1 No Yes (uncapped) 1 Yes 
Florida 15 No No (punitive capped at 
$100k) 
15 Yes 
Georgia 15 No No (no punitive) 1 No 
Hawaii 1 No Yes (uncapped) 1 Yes 
Idaho 5 No No (punitive capped at 
$10k) 
5 Yes 
Illinois 15 Yes No (no punitive) 15 Yes 
Indiana 15 (was 25 before 
July 25, 1994)  
No No (no punitive) 1 No 
Iowa 4 No No (no punitive) 4 Yes 
Kansas 4 No No (damages capped at $2k) 4 Yes 
Kentucky 15 No No (no punitive) 8 Yes 
Louisiana 20 No No (no punitive) 20 Yes 
Maine 1 No Yes 1 Yes 
Maryland 15 No No (same as ADA) 15 Yes 
Massachusetts 6 No Yes (uncapped) 6 Yes 
Michigan 1 No No (no punitive) 1 Yes 
Minnesota 1 No (“materially 
limits” only) 
No (punitive capped at 
$25k) 
1 Yes 
Mississippi No law No law No law No law No law 
Missouri 6 No Yes (uncapped) 6 Yes 
Montana 1 No No (no punitive) 1 Yes 
Nebraska 15 No No (no punitive) 20 No 
Nevada 15 No Yes 15 No 
New Hampshire 6 No No (no punitive) 6 Yes 
New Jersey 1 Yes Yes (uncapped) 1 Yes 
New Mexico 4 No No (no punitive) 4 Yes 
New York 4 Yes No (no punitive) 4 Yes 
North Carolina 15 No Yes 15 No 
North Dakota 1 No No (no damages) 1 No 
Ohio 4 No Yes (uncapped) 4 Yes 
Oklahoma 15 No No (no punitive) 15 No 
Oregon 1 No Yes (uncapped) 1 Yes 
Pennsylvania 4 No No (no punitive) 4 No 
Rhode Island 4 No Yes (uncapped) 4 Yes 
South Carolina 15 No No (same as ADA) 15 No 
South Dakota 1 No No (no punitive) No law No law 
Tennessee 8 No No (no punitive) 8 Yes 
Texas 15 No No (same as ADA) 15 Yes 
Utah 15 No No (no punitive) 15 No 
Vermont 1 No Yes (uncapped effective 
May 13, 1999, previously 
no punitive damages) 
1 Yes 
Virginia 5 No No (no punitive) 5 No 
Washington 8 Yes (effective May 
4, 2007) 
No (no punitive) 8 Yes 
West Virginia 12 No Yes (uncapped) 12 No 
Wisconsin 1 No No (no damages) 1 No 
 
 
 Disability discrimination laws Age discrimination laws 
State Minimum firm size 
Broader definition 





Wyoming 2 No No (no punitive) 2 No 
Notes: State laws are as of 2008. Age discrimination laws from Neumark and Song (2013).  For the states listed as “Yes” under Larger 
Damages than ADA, but not uncapped, detailes are as follow:  Alaska – uncapped compensatory damages, punitive damages capped 
above ADA levels; Maine – exceeds ADA cap for firms of 201+ employees; Nevada – uncapped compensatory damages except 
against government,  punitive damages capped at maximum of $300k and three times compensatory damages; North Carolina – 




Table 2: HRS and SIPP Descriptive Statistics 
 HRS 
 Age 53 - 69 
Nondisabled Disabled 

















































N 5,240 4,802 
Notes: Standard errors of means are reported in parentheses.  Person-level sampling weights are used.  
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N 746,676 312,098 205,110 153,164 
Table 3: Estimation Results and Significance Tests for Disability Discrimination Law Provisions, Hiring from Nonemployment 
  Broader definition of disability Larger damages Firm-size minimum < 10 































Age 20-29  Avg. diff. ... ... -0.024 -0.006 ... ... -0.001 0.014 ... ...  0.0003 0.007 
% pos. 0% 40% 40% 80% 50% 80% 
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.197 0.225 0.361 0.061 
Age 30-39  Avg. diff. ... ... -0.011 0.003 ... ... -0.005 -0.004 ... ... -0.007 -0.002 
% pos. 10% 60% 20% 30% 10% 40% 
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.239 0.485 0.115 0.149 
Age 40-49  Avg. diff. ... ... -0.017 -0.003 ... ... -0.013 0.005 ... ... -0.011 0.002 
% pos. 10% 40% 20% 80% 10% 70% 
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.201 0.017 0.000 0.200 
Age 50-61  Avg. diff. ... ... -0.002 0.002 ... ... 0.0001 0.001 ... ... 0.002 0.002 
% pos. 33.3% 67.7% 50% 50% 66.7% 83.3% 
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.003 0.023 0.243 
Age 62-69  Avg. diff. -0.023 -0.016 0.0003 -0.001 -0.019 -0.013 0.0001 -0.001 -0.019 -0.008 0.0002 -0.0001 
% pos. 37.5% 25.0% 62.5% 12.5% 12.5% 37.5% 62.5% 25% 22.2% 44.4% 50.0% 62.5% 
p-value 0.694 0.396 0.000 0.000 0.860 0.504 0.319 0.952 0.221 0.417 0.000 0.545 
Age 40-52 Avg. diff. … … -0.014 0.001 ... ... -0.008 0.004 ... ... 0.0002 0.002 
% pos. 15.4% 53.8% 30.8% 76.9% 23.1% 61.5% 
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.083 
Age 53-61 Avg. diff. 0.019 -0.003 -0.003 0.001 -0.007 0.014 -0.003 0.0005 0.033 -0.005 -0.010 0.002 
% pos. 66.7% 28.6% 33.3% 55.6% 44.4% 50% 44.4% 44.4% 62.5% 50.0% 66.7% 100% 
p-value 0.539 0.509 0.001 0.000 0.418 0.976 0.001 0.010 0.690 0.442 0.039 0.759 
Age 53-69  Avg. diff. -0.001 -0.011 -0.001 -0.0003 -0.013 -0.000 -0.002 -0.0001 0.008 -0.007 0.001 0.001 
% pos. 52.9% 26.7% 47.1% 35.3% 29.4% 43.8% 52.9% 35.3% 41.2% 47.1% 58.8% 82.4% 
p-value 0.704 0.469 0.000 0.000 0.729 0.890 0.000 0.001 0.437 0.452 0.000 0.307 
Notes: The estimates and tests in this table are based on the model estimates used to construct Figures 2 and 3.  See notes to Figures 2 and 3 for details.  For each age range, 
in each entry the table reports: (1) the average across the covered ages of the estimated differences in hiring rates between states with stronger and weaker disability 
discrimination laws; (2) the share of ages in the range for which the estimated hiring rate is higher with the stronger law; and (3) p-values for a joint (Wald) test of no 





Table 4: Estimation Results and Significance Tests for Disability Discrimination Law Provisions, Hiring from Nonemployment, Substituting Fair or 
Bad Health as a Disability Measure 
  
 
Broader definition of disability Larger damages Firm-size minimum < 10 
  































Age 20-29 Avg. diff. ... ... -0.017 -0.004 ... ... 0.001 0.011 ... ... 0.0003 0.005  
% pos. 10% 30% 60% 80% 50% 70% 
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.271 0.002 0.221 0.064 
Age 30-39 Avg. diff. ... ... -0.005 0.005 ... ... -0.002 0.0004 ... ... -0.007  -0.003 
% pos. 30% 60% 30% 60% 10% 40% 
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.005 0.445 0.034 0.059 
Age 40-49 Avg. diff. ... ... -0.014 0.001 ... ... -0.002 0.002 ... ... -0.008  -0.0003 
% pos. 0% 50% 30% 60% 10% 50% 
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.038 0.095 0.049 0.498 
Age 50-61 Avg. diff. ... ... 0.001 0.002 ... ... -0.001 0.002  ... ... -0.001  0.002 
% pos. 58.0% 41.7% 50% 66.7% 50% 83.3% 
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.196 0.047 0.044 
Age 62-69  Avg. diff. -0.029 -0.008 0.0003 -0.001 -0.024 0.005 -0.0004 -0.0004 -0.002 0.004 0.000 0.0004 





p-value 0.694 0.396 0.000 0.000 0.860 0.504 0.191 0.000 0.417 0.021 0.000 
Age 40-52 Avg. diff. … … -0.010 0.002 ... ... -0.001 0.003 ... ... -0.008  0.0004 
% pos. 15.4% 46.2% 38.5% 69.2% 23.1% 61.5% 
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.014 0.024 0.505 
Age 53-61 Avg. diff. -0.015 -0.029 -0.0004 0.001 -0.028 0.010 -0.004 0.0004 0.023 0.020 0.000  0.002 
% pos. 16.7% 66.7% 55.6% 44.4% 33.3% 44.4% 44.4% 55.6% 44.4% 75% 44.4% 77.8% 
p-value 0.539 0.509 0.000 0.000 0.418 0.976 0.008 0.363 0.690 0.442 0.331 0.141 
Age 53-69 Avg. diff. -0.033 -0.020 -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.026 0.009 -0.002 0.000 0.002 0.013 0.0001 0.001 
% pos. 15.4% 53.8% 58.8% 47.1% 23.5% 50% 41.2% 47.1 29.4% 62.5% 58.8% 70.6% 
p-value 0.704 0.469 0.000 0.000 0.729 0.890 0.000 0.000 0.437 0.452 0.000 0.000 




Table 5: Difference-in-Differences Estimates of Effects of Stronger Disability Discrimination Laws on Hiring of Nondisabled Older Workers, SIPP 
Data, Hiring from Nonemployment 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Age ≥ 50 × broader 
definition of disability 
0.016** 
(0.007) 




… … 0.019** 
(0.008) 


















Age ≥ 50 × age disc. 
larger damages 








Age ≥ 50 × age disc. firm 
size < 10 








Age ≥ 55 × broader 
definition of disability 
0.016** 
(0.007) 




… …  0.018**
(0.008) 








… 0.009  
(0.006) 








Age ≥ 55 × age disc. 
larger damages 








Age ≥ 55 × age disc. firm 
size < 10 








Age ≥ 60 × broader 
definition of disability 
0.012* 
(0.006) 




… …  0.015**  
(0.007) 


















Age ≥ 60 × age disc. 
larger damages  








Age ≥ 60 × age disc. firm 
size < 10 
… … 
… 








N 312,224 312,224 312,224 312,224 312,224 312,224 312,224 312,224 
Notes: The linear probability model is used for estimation conditional on respondents begin not working at t-1.  Standard errors reported in parentheses are clustered at the 
state level. ***, **, and * indicate that the estimates are statistically significant at the one-, five-, or ten-percent level.  Each panel reports estimates of separate specification 
using the different specified age groups. The models are estimated separately for the nondisabled and the disabled.  We use the SIPP 1992, 1993, 1996, 2001, and 2004 
panels for this analysis, so the sample period is October 1991 through December 2007.  We restrict the sample to adult males who are 31 or older and use person-level SIPP 
sampling weights.  Each specification includes state and year fixed effects, single-year age dummy variables, and the same individual-level controls described in the notes to 
 
 
Figure 3.  All analyses include a dummy variable whether the hiring occurred during the last month of each wave to control for the seam bias.  The main effects of the 
discrimination law dummy variables are not reported as they are either subsumed in the state fixed effects or identified from a very small number of states and hence are not 
reliable.  Maine, Vermont, North Dakota, South Dakota, and Wyoming are deleted from the sample because they are not uniquely identified in SIPP 1992, 1993, 1996 and 
2001 panels.  The disability definition is based on self-reported variable “[Do you] have a physical, mental, or other health condition that limits the kind or amount of work 
[you] can do?”  This question is asked only for those 69 years or younger.  See the text and Table 1 for discussion and classification of states by characteristics of disability 
(and age) discrimination laws.
 
 
Table 6: Difference-in-Differences Estimates of Effects of Stronger Disability Discrimination Laws on Hiring of Nondisabled Older Workers, SIPP 
Data, Hiring from Nonemployment, Substituting Fair or Bad Health as a Disability Measure 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Age ≥ 50 × broader 
definition of disability 
0.012 
(0.008) 




… … 0.012 
(0.008) 


















Age ≥ 50 × age disc. 
larger damages 








Age ≥ 50 × age disc. firm 
size < 10 








Age ≥ 55 × broader 
definition of disability 
0.010 
(0.008) 




… …  0.010
(0.008) 








… 0.002  
(0.006) 








Age ≥ 55 × age disc. 
larger damages 








Age ≥ 55 × age disc. firm 
size < 10 








Age ≥ 60 × broader 
definition of disability 
0.008 
(0.007) 
… … 0.007 
(0.007) 
 **  0.008
(0.006) 
… … 0.008  
(0.007) 


















Age ≥ 60 × age disc. 
larger damages  








Age ≥ 60 × age disc. firm 
size < 10 
… … 
… 








N 322,110 322,110 322,110 322,110 322,110 322,110 322,110 322,110 






Appendix Table A1: Relationships between Alternative Disability Measures, Difficulties in Activities, Functional Limitations, and Doctor-Diagnosed 
Medical Problems 






room Dressing Bathing Eating 
Getting in 
and out of 
bed 
Using 















Health limits work 
No 
 
1.07%  2.52%  1.13%  0.44%  1.43%  1.28%  8.77%  1.12%  1.95%  
 




Yes 19.16% 24.49% 19.77% 9.68 18.05% 15.77% 25.49% 12.13% 17.12% 
 
10.26% 27.31% 19.27% 
Fair/bad health 
No 2.61%  4.21%  2.77%  1.22%  2.34%  2.49%  9.82%  2.33%  3.65%  1.8%  4.21%  2.94%  






































Health limits work 
No 11.45%  54.35%  3.53%  11.18%  24.98%  28.15%  6.00%  29.01%  9.23%  2.83%  7.66%  11.03%  
Yes 63.29% 86.99% 35.91% 37.14% 64.85% 76.66% 41.66% 73.38% 53.01% 15.6% 34.38% 56.87% 
Fair/bad health 
No 16.40%  57.92%  6.05%  12.95%  28.76%  32.44%  8.79%  33.91%  13.44%  3.97%  9.40%  15.44%  
Yes 62.83% 77.47% 36.75% 35.15% 62.70% 76.00% 43.88% 69.62% 51.68% 15.64% 34.37% 54.74% 
Doctor-diagnosed medical problems 
High 
blood 




problem  Stroke 
Psychological 
problem Arthritis 
Health limits work  
No 44.86% 13.01% 9.57% 5.11% 14.00% 2.99% 9.57% 44.20% 
Yes 64.13% 26.49% 15.72% 18.16% 36.07% 13.79% 28.48% 73.66% 
Fair-bad health 
No 45.66%  12.09%  10.24%  5.60%  15.92%  3.95%  10.49%  46.91%  
Yes 66.77% 29.97% 16.62% 18.9% 38.62% 14.56% 27.3% 68.81% 
Notes: These calculations are based on HRS raw data, without adjustment. We are reporting conditional distribution of “health limits work” and “fair/bad health” for respondents who 
























Definition of Disability 
Some state laws bypass the requirement that a mental or physical impairment “substantially limits” one or 
more major life activities.  This occurs either by replacing “substantially limits” with either just “limits” 
(California) or “materially limits” (Minnesota), or by defining disability as a medical diagnosis 
(Connecticut, Illinois, New Jersey, New York, Washington effective May 4, 2007).  These state laws are 
discussed in more detail below. 
California 
California adopts a similar definition of disability to the ADA, but specifies in statute that the impairment 
must “limit” instead of “substantially limit” a major life activity.  For mental disability this is described as 
“Having any mental or psychological disorder or condition, such as intellectual disability, organic brain 
syndrome, emotional or mental illness, or specific learning disabilities, that limits a major life activity” 
(CAL GOV CODE § 12926 (j)(1)).  The language is similar for physical disability. 
Although dropping the word “substantially” may seem trivial, this did in fact make establishing that a 
disability exists less burdensome, but not initially.  The Prudence Kay Poppink Act took effect in 
California in 2001, and this act made it explicit that the “limits” requirement in California was less 
burdensome than the federal ADA.  Before this act passed however, the “limits” requirement was 
interpreted in the same way as the federal ADA (Long, 2004).  For example, in Colmenares v. Braemer 
Country Club, Inc., 63 P.3d 220, 223 (Cal. 2003), the plaintiff was deemed not disabled because his case 
preceded the Poppink Act, when California’s “limits” was interpreted the same as the ADA’s 
“substantially limits.”  However, other decisions claimed that the Poppink Act applied retroactively.1 
                                                 
1 See http://www.larryminsky.com/article1.aspx (viewed February 2, 2015).  
Connecticut 
In Connecticut, a diagnosis of a physical or mental impairment makes the individual disabled under law, 
bypassing the “substantially limits” requirement.  CONN. GEN. STAT. § 46a-51(15). states that 
“‘Physically disabled’ refers to any individual who has any chronic physical handicap, infirmity or 
impairment, whether congenital or resulting from bodily injury, organic processes or changes or from 
illness, including, but not limited to, epilepsy, deafness or hearing impairment or reliance on a wheelchair 
or other remedial appliance or device.”  
Connecticut is even more explicit in its definition of mental disability (Long, 2004), as CONN. GEN. 
STAT. § 46a-51(20) states that “ ‘Mental disability’ refers to an individual who has a record of, or is 
regarded as having one or more mental disorders, as defined in the most recent edition of the American 
Psychiatric Association's ‘Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders.’” 
Illinois 
775 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/1-103(I) defines a disability as “…a determinable physical or mental 
characteristic of a person, including, but not limited to, a determinable physical characteristic which 
necessitates the person's use of a guide, hearing or support dog, the history of such characteristic, or the 
perception of such characteristic by the person complained against, which may result from disease, injury, 
congenital condition of birth or functional disorder…” 
Minnesota 
Similar to California, MINN. STAT. § 363.01(12) defines disability as “…any condition or characteristic 
that renders a person a disabled person.  A disabled person is any person who (1) has a physical, sensory, 




impairment; or (3) is regarded as having such an impairment.”  While the distinction between materially 
and substantially may seem trivial, Long (2004) notes that the Minnesota Supreme Court, in Sigurdson v. 
Carl Bolander & Sons, Co., 532 N.W.2d 225, 228 n.3 (Minn. 1995), stated that the Minnesota definition 
is less stringent. 
New Jersey 
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 10:5-5(q) defines disability as a “…physical disability, infirmity, malformation or 
disfigurement which is caused by bodily injury, birth defect or illness including epilepsy and other seizure 
disorders, and which shall include, but not be limited to, any degree of paralysis, amputation, lack of 
physical coordination, blindness or visual impediment, deafness or hearing impediment, muteness or 
speech impediment or physical reliance on a service or guide dog, wheelchair, or other remedial appliance 
or device, or any mental, psychological or developmental disability, including autism spectrum disorders, 
resulting from anatomical, psychological, physiological or neurological conditions which prevents the 
normal exercise of any bodily or mental functions or is demonstrable, medically or psychologically, by 
accepted clinical or laboratory diagnostic techniques. Disability shall also mean AIDS or HIV infection.” 
New York 
New York's Executive Law § 292(21)(a) defines a disability as “a physical, mental or medical impairment 
resulting from anatomical, physiological, genetic or neurological conditions which prevents the exercise 
of a normal bodily function or is demonstrable by medically accepted clinical or laboratory diagnostic 
techniques.”  The requirement that the impairment be “demonstrable by medically accepted clinical or 
laboratory diagnostic techniques” bypasses the “substantially limits” requirement and makes New York 
disability discrimination law more broadly applicable (Long, 2004).  
Washington  
Washington’s definition of disability was rather vague before an amendment, effective May 4, 2007, 
changed Washington’s definition to follow a medical diagnosis definition like Connecticut, Illinois, New 
Jersey, and New York.  Prior to this amendment, WASH. REV. CODE § 49.60.180 prohibited 
discrimination on the basis of physical disability, but the term was not defined.  Noting this, Long (2004) 
could not categorize Washington’s laws and instead put them in a “miscellaneous” category.  It appears 
that Washington’s lack of definition caused courts to rely on the federal definition of disability, which 
included the “substantially limits” requirement.2  After the 2007 amendment, Washington law states that 
“‘Disability’ means the presence of a sensory, mental, or physical impairment that: 
                                                 
2 See Pulcino v. Fed. Express Corp., 9 P.3d 787, 794 (Wash. 2000) as discussed by Long (2004). 
(i) Is medically cognizable or diagnosable; or 
(ii) Exists as a record or history; or 
(iii) Is perceived to exist whether or not it exists in fact” (Wash. Rev. Code § 49.60.040 (7)(a)). 
 
Compensatory and Punitive Damages 
As discussed in the main text, we classify 15 states as having damages that exceed those provided by the 
ADA.  Of these 15 larger damages states, four states (AK, ME, NV, NC) have compensatory and/or 
punitive damage caps that exceed those of the ADA, while the remaining eleven (CA, DC, HI, MA, MO, 
NJ, OH, OR, RI, VT, WV) have compensatory and punitive damages that are both uncapped.  Of the 36 
states that we classify as not having damages that exceed the ADA, six states (AR, CO, DE, MD, SC, TX) 
have the exact same damage caps as the ADA, four (FL, ID, KS, MN) have lower damage caps, 24 do not 





SD, TN, UT, VA, WA, WI, WY), and two (AL, MS) do not have an employment nondiscrimination law 
for disability. 
States with Uncapped Compensatory and Punitive Damages 
Ten states (CA, HI, MA, MO, NJ, OH, OR, RI, VT, and WV, plus DC) offer both compensatory and 
punitive damages that are uncapped.  Determining that these damages were in fact uncapped was difficult.  
For all these states, statutes did not mention explicit caps on damages, nor was there explicit mention that 
damages were uncapped.  While it seemed likely that these states allowed uncapped damages, we 
confirmed this conjecture with various sources. 
California 
California’s employment nondiscrimination law is vague as to what damages are available, and this had to 
be clarified in case law.  As mentioned by Defense Research Institute, Inc. (DRI, 2011, p. 27), the Fair 
Employment and Housing Act (Cal. Govt. Code §§12900–12996) provides no statutory caps on civil 
damages.  The case Commodore Home Sys., Inc. v. Superior Court, 32 Cal. 3d 211, 221 (1982) 
concluded that allowable damages fell under Cal. Civ. Code, § 3294, which provides no caps.3  
                                                 
3 See http://scocal.stanford.edu/opinion/commodore-home-systems-inc-v-superior-court-28300 (viewed February 
2,015). 
District of Columbia 
As mentioned by DRI (2011, p. 67), D.C. law (D.C. Mun. Regs. 4 §§210–212) allows for both 
compensatory and punitive damages.  Caps, or lack thereof, are not explicitly mentioned.  DRI (2011, p. 
67) confirms that there are in fact no caps. 
Hawaii 
Hawaii’s employment nondiscrimination law states that compensatory and punitive damages are 
available, but no caps, or lack thereof, are explicitly mentioned (HI ST § 378-5, HI ST § 368-17).  DRI 
(2011, p. 97) confirms that there are in fact no caps. 
Massachusetts 
Massachusetts’ employment nondiscrimination law states that compensatory and punitive damages are 
available, but no caps, or lack thereof, are explicitly mentioned (MA ST 151B).  These damages can only 
be obtained from trial court and not through the Massachusetts Commission Against Discrimination 
(MCAD) (DRI, 2011, p. 191) (Sperino, 2010).  
Missouri 
Missouri’s employment nondiscrimination law states that compensatory and punitive damages are 
available, but no caps, or lack thereof, are explicitly mentioned (MO ST 213).  According to case law 
mentioned by DRI (2011, p. 223) “…the Missouri Courts of Appeals have indicated that, in most 
situations, the courts should not allow punitive damages in excess of a single digit ratio to actual 
damages.  State ex rel. Bass Pro Outdoor World, LLC v. Schneider, 302 S.W.3d 103 (Mo. App. 2009).  
At least one court has held, however, that in appropriate circumstances a punitive damage award could 
significantly exceed a single digit ratio. Lynn v. TNT Logistics North America, Inc., 275 S.W.3d 304 





New Jersey’s employment nondiscrimination law states that “All remedies available in common law tort 
actions shall be available to prevailing plaintiffs” (N.J.S.A. 10:5-13).  This includes compensatory and 
punitive damages (DRI, 2011, p. 254) but there is no explicit mention of caps, or lack thereof.  Case law, 
such as Baker v. National State Bank, 801 A.2d 1158 (N.J. App. Div. 2002) indicates that these damages 
are uncapped (DRI, 2011, p. 253). 
Ohio 
According to DRI (2011, p. 311), uncapped compensatory and punitive damages are allowed under civil 
actions.  These damages are capped if the case is handled by the Ohio Civil Rights Commission. 
Oregon 
Oregon’s employment nondiscrimination law states: “The court may award, in addition to the relief 
authorized under subsection (1) of this section, compensatory damages or $200, whichever is greater, and 
punitive damages…” (OR ST § 659A.885(3)(a)).  DRI (2011, p. 326) confirms that damages are 
uncapped, noting that there are caps only if the action is against a government entity. 
Rhode Island 
Rhode Island’s employment nondiscrimination law states that: “Any person with a disability who is the 
victim of discrimination prohibited by this chapter may bring an action in the Superior Court against the 
person or entity causing the discrimination for equitable relief, compensatory and/or punitive damages or 
for any other relief that the court deems appropriate” (RI ST § 42-87-4).  DRI (2011, p. 352) confirms that 
there are no caps, but notes that judges may intervene in cases when juries wish to award punitive 
damages that are deemed excessive, as in Mazzaroppi v. Tocco, 533 A.2d 203 (R.I. 1987). 
Vermont 
Vermont’s employment nondiscrimination law states that: “Any person aggrieved by a violation of the 
provisions of this subchapter may bring an action in superior court seeking compensatory and punitive 
damages or equitable relief, including restraint of prohibited acts, restitution of wages or other benefits, 
reinstatement, costs, reasonable attorney’s fees and other appropriate relief” (21 V.S.A. §495b). DRI 
(2011, p. 399) interprets this to mean that both compensatory and punitive damages are uncapped.  The 
language “compensatory and punitive damages” was added by 1999, No. 19, § 5.  Before this, the statute 
just said “damages” and it was left ambiguous if punitive damages were covered.  This question was 
settled in Fernot v. Crafts Inn, Inc., 895 F. Supp. 668, 682 (D. Vt. 1995), where it was deemed that 
punitive damages were not allowed. Thus, we interpret that while Vermont has consistently had uncapped 
compensatory damages, punitive damages only became available (uncapped) effective on the 
amendment’s approval on May 13, 1999.  Since we use annual data we code the change as effective 2000. 
West Virginia 
West Virginia’s employment nondiscrimination law does not directly state that compensatory and 
punitive damages are available.  It states that remedies include: “…reinstatement or hiring of employees, 
granting of back pay or any other legal or equitable relief as the court deems appropriate.  In actions 
brought under this section, the court in its discretion may award all or a portion of the costs of litigation, 
including reasonable attorney fees and witness fees, to the complainant” (W. Va. Code §5-11-13).  DRI 
(2011, p. 428) deems punitive damages to be available, citing Haynes v. Rhone-Poulenc, Inc.,521 S.E.2d 
331 (W. Va. 1999) as an example.  The question of if compensatory damages were available was settled 
in State Human Rights Commission v. Pauley, 212 S.E.2d 77 (W. Va. 1975), where the West Virginia 




States with Caps that Exceed the ADA 
Alaska 
Alaska’s damages, as described in AS § 09.17.020(h), exceed those of the ADA for all firm sizes: 
“(h) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, in an action against an employer to recover damages for 
an unlawful employment practice prohibited by AS 18.80.220, the amount of punitive damages awarded 
by the court or jury may not exceed 
(1) $200,000 if the employer has less than 100 employees in this state; 
(2) $300,000 if the employer has 100 or more but less than 200 employees in this state; 
(3) $400,000 if the employer has 200 or more but less than 500 employees in this state; and 
(4) $500,000 if the employer has 500 or more employees in this state.” 
Maine 
Maine’s damages, as described in 5 M.R.S.A. §4613(2)(B)(8), exceed those of the ADA for firms with 
201 or more employees. 
“(e) The sum of compensatory damages awarded under this subparagraph for future pecuniary losses, 
emotional pain, suffering, inconvenience, mental anguish, loss of enjoyment of life, other nonpecuniary 
losses and the amount of punitive damages awarded under this section may not exceed for each 
complaining party: 
(i) In the case of a respondent who has more than 14 and fewer than 101 employees in each of 20 or 
more calendar weeks in the current or preceding calendar year, $50,000; 
(ii) In the case of a respondent who has more than 100 and fewer than 201 employees in each of 20 or 
more calendar weeks in the current or preceding calendar year, $100,000; 
(iii) In the case of a respondent who has more than 200 and fewer than 501 employees in each of 20 or 
more calendar weeks in the current or preceding calendar year, $300,000; and 
(iv) In the case of a respondent who has more than 500 employees in each of 20 or more calendar 
weeks in the current or preceding calendar year, $500,000.” 
Nevada 
The section of the statute detailing employment nondiscrimination law does not discuss damages, but the 
statute describing damages in general does apply (NV ST 42.001).  
“…Except as otherwise provided in this section or by specific statute, an award of exemplary or punitive 
damages made pursuant to this section may not exceed: 
a) Three times the amount of compensatory damages awarded to the plaintiff if the amount of 
compensatory damages is $100,000 or more; or 
b) Three hundred thousand dollars if the amount of compensatory damages awarded to the plaintiff 
is less than $100,000.” 
Compensatory damages are allowed and uncapped (Green 1992; Buckley and Green 1997, 2002, 2006, 
2008, 2009, and 2011) while punitive damages are capped as described above, such that, regardless of 
firm size, punitive damages strictly exceed the sum of both punitive and compensatory damages available 






Compensatory damages are allowed and uncapped (Perry, 2011), while punitive damages are capped 
pursuant to NC ST § 1D-25:  
“§ 1D-25.  Limitation of amount of recovery. 
(a) In all actions seeking an award of punitive damages, the trier of fact shall determine the amount 
of punitive damages separately from the amount of compensation for all other damages. 
(b) Punitive damages awarded against a defendant shall not exceed three times the amount of 
compensatory damages or two hundred fifty thousand dollars ($250,000), whichever is greater.   
If a trier of fact returns a verdict for punitive damages in excess of the maximum amount 
specified under this subsection, the trial court shall reduce the award and enter judgment for 
punitive damages in the maximum amount.” 
Theses damages exceed those under the ADA except in the extremely rare case where firm size is greater 
than 500 but compensatory damages are less than $50,000.  In this case the ADA would allow slightly 
more punitive damages. 
States with the Same Damage Caps as the ADA 
Arkansas 
The Arkansas Civil Rights Act (Ark. Code Ann. §§16-123-101 et seq.) specifies the same damage caps as 
the ADA (§§16-123-107(c)(2)(A)).  However, since firms of size nine to 14 are also covered under this 
law, the damage cap for this group is set at $15,000. 
Colorado 
The Colorado Anti-Discrimination Act (C.R.S. §§24-34-301 et seq.) allows both compensatory and 
punitive damages, but explicitly mentions that they are capped at ADA levels (see 42 U.S.C. sec. 
1981a(b)(3)).  Since the firm size minimum is one, damage caps are $10,000 for one to four employees, 
and $25,000 for five to 14 employees (C.R.S. §§24-34-405(d)). 
Delaware 
The Delaware Discrimination in Employment Act (19 Del. C. §711 et seq.) specifies that damages are 
capped at the same level as Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which are the same damage caps 
that apply to the ADA. 
Maryland 
The Maryland Fair Employment Practices Act (Md. Code Ann., State Gov’t §20–601 et seq.) provides for 
the same damage caps as the ADA (Md. Code Ann., State Gov’t §20–1009(3)).  Prior to the passage of 
Acts 2007, c. 176, however, the Maryland Fair Employment Practices Act did not allow punitive 
damages. 
South Carolina 
The South Carolina Human Affairs Law (S.C. Code §§1-13-10 et seq.) does not explicitly mention 
compensatory or punitive damages.  DRI (2011, p. 363) argues that the damages are identical to those 
under Title VII / ADA cases, noting case law which states: “Thus, Title VII cases which interpret 
provisions or procedures essentially identical to those of the Human Affairs Law are certainly persuasive 





The Texas Commission on Human Rights Act (Tex. Lab. Code §§21.001 et seq.) lists the same damage 
caps as the ADA. 
States with Lower Damage Caps than the ADA 
Florida 
The Florida Civil Rights Act of 1992 (Fla. Stat. §§760.01 et seq.) allows uncapped compensatory 
damages, but it caps punitive damages at $100,000 (Fla. Stat. §§760.11(5)). 
Idaho 
Idaho allows “actual damages,” and the statute does not mention caps, or a lack thereof (Idaho Code §67-
5908(c)).  Secondary sources were uninformative as to if this meant that actual damages were uncapped 
(DRI, 2011, p. 105; Green 1992; Buckley and Green 1997, 2002, 2006, 2008, 2009, and 2011).  However, 
punitive damages are capped at $1,000 per willful violation (Idaho Code §67-5908(e)). 
Kansas 
The Kansas Act Against Discrimination (K.S.A. §44-1001, et seq.) caps damages at $2,000.  DRI (2011, 
p. 139), citing Labra v. Mid-Plains Constr., Inc., 32 Kan. App. 2d 821, 823, 90 P.3d 954 (2004), notes 
that it is unclear if this cap applies only to administrative proceedings or if it also applies to private 
actions.  
Minnesota 
The Minnesota Human Rights Act (Minn. Stat. §363A) allows for compensatory damages capped at three 
times actual damages and punitive damages capped at $25,000 (Minn. Stat. §363A.29 Subd.4(a)). 
States that Do Not Allow Punitive Damages 
Arizona 
Arizona’s employment nondiscrimination law does not mention compensatory or punitive damages, only 
mentioning nonmonetary remedies, back pay, and that there is available “… any other equitable relief as 
the court deems appropriate” (A.R.S. §41-1481(G)).  The history preamble to H.B. 2319 (Ariz. 45th 
legislature, 2001), an unpassed bill that attempted to amend this law, states that “Under Arizona law, the 
Attorney General’s Civil Rights Division may only seek relief on behalf of a victim of discrimination in 
the name of the aggrieved party.  Compensatory and punitive damages are not currently available to an 
aggrieved party under Arizona employment law, although under Arizona’s housing law an aggrieved 
party may be awarded compensatory and punitive damages, and under the Arizonans with Disabilities 
Act, compensatory damages.” 
Connecticut 
Punitive damages are capped as the amount equal to reasonable attorney’s fees and costs (DRI, 2011, p. 
49) as in Ford v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Conn., Inc., 216 Conn. 40 (1990). 
Georgia 
O.C.G.A. §45-19-38(d) states that “Any monetary award ordered pursuant to this article shall be for 





Case law indicates that punitive damages are not allowed under Iowa’s employment nondiscrimination 
law, but compensatory damages are allowed an uncapped.  Case law notes via WestLaw (2013a, p. 156) 
for IA ST § 216.6 states: “Whereas Title VII places cap on compensatory and punitive damages 
recoverable by plaintiff who prevails on sex discrimination claims, the Iowa Civil Rights Act (ICRA) 
allows no punitive damages, but does not place cap on amount of compensatory damages.  Baker v. John 
Morrell & Co., N.D.Iowa2003, 266 F.Supp.2d 909, affirmed 382 F.3d 816, rehearing and rehearing en 
banc denied.”  Other case law supports a lack of punitive damages: City of Hampton v Iowa Civil Rights 
Comm’n, 554 N.W.2d (referenced by DRI, 2011, p. 131), Ewing v. Federal Home Loan Bank of Des 
Moines, S.D.Iowa2009, 645 F.Supp.2d 707, Pospisil v. O’Reilly Automotive, Inc., N.D.Iowa2007, 619 
F.Supp.2d 614, and Faust v. Command Center, Inc., S.D.Iowa2007, 484 F.Supp.2d 953, 100 Fair 
Empl.Prac.Cas. (BNA) 1238. Civil Rights (all three also mentioned in Westlaw, 2013a). 
Illinois 
Both Geslewitz (2007) and Smith, O’Callaghan, and White (2007) state that in the Illinois Human Rights 
Act (775 ILCS 5/1-101 et seq.), punitive damages are not allowed but uncapped compensatory damages 
are available.  Although this law was amended in 2007 to allow a private right of action, this did not 
change the available remedies. 
Indiana 
The Indiana Civil Rights Law does not mention compensatory or punitive damages.  Case law clarified 
that the Indiana Civil Rights Commission (ICRC) is authorized to award damages to compensate for both 
economic and emotional distress losses but is not authorized to award punitive damages.  See Indiana 
Civil Rights Com'n v. Alder, 1999, 714 N.E.2d 632 (referenced by Westlaw, 2013b, p. 39 and p. 67). 
Kentucky 
Kentucky allows for compensatory damages (K.R.S. §344.230 (3); K.R.S. §344.450).  No caps are 
mentioned in statute and other sources do not mention caps except to confirm that caps are not codified in 
statute (DRI 2011, p. 153; Buckley and Green 1997, 2002, 2006, 2008, 2009, and 2011; Green 1992).  
The availability of punitive damages was unclear until the Kentucky Supreme Court investigated this in 
2003 and 2004. DRI (2011, p. 154) notes that: “The Kentucky Supreme Court recently clarified, in 
contrast to earlier decisions, that punitive damages are not available under the KCRA statutes. Kentucky 
Dep’t of Corrs. v. McCullough, 123 S.W.3d 130, 138–39 (Ky. 2003); Brooks v. Lexington-Fayette Urban 
County Hous. Auth., 132 S.W.3d 790 (Ky. 2004).” 
Louisiana 
Louisiana allows compensatory damages, and the statute mentions no caps (La. R.S. §23:303(A)). DRI 
(2011, p. 160) states that there are no caps.  Punitive damages are not available, as DRI (2011, p. 160) 
notes that “… punitive damages are not available under Louisiana law unless expressly authorized by 
statute. See, e.g., Ross v. Conoco, Inc., 2002-0299 (La. 10/15/02); 828 So. 2d 546, 555.”  
Michigan 
The Michigan’s Persons with Disabilities Civil Rights Act (M.CL. §§37.1101 et seq.) is not explicit about 
compensatory and punitive damages, stating that: “… “damages” means damages for injury or loss 
caused by each violation of this act, including reasonable attorneys’ fees.”  (M.CL. §§37.1606(3)) DRI 
(2011, p. 201) states that while compensatory damages are allowed and uncapped, punitive damages 





The Montana Human Rights Act does not explicitly mention compensatory damages.  DRI (2011, p.  229) 
and Perry (2011) both state that compensatory damages are allowed and uncapped.  However, punitive 
damages are not allowed for employment discrimination and this is noted explicitly in statute (Mont. 
Code Ann. §§49-2-506(2)). 
Nebraska 
The Nebraska Fair Employment Practice Act (Neb. Rev. Stat. §§48-1101 et seq.) does not explicitly 
indicate if compensatory or punitive damages are available.  Gradwohl (1995) and DRI (2011, p. 235) 
state that punitive damages are generally unavailable in Nebraska.  Buckley and Green (2002, 2008) state 
that compensatory damages are available, but do not mention caps or a lack thereof. 
New Hampshire 
According to New Hampshire’s employment nondiscrimination law, compensatory damages are available 
(N.H. R.S.A. 354A-21(d)).  Punitive damages are not mentioned, but DRI (2011, p. 247) states that New 
Hampshire law does not allow them. 
New Mexico 
The New Mexico Human Rights Act provides for “actual damages” with no caps mentioned (NMSA 
§§28-1-11-E).  DRI (2011, p. 265) indicates that this meanS that there are uncapped compensatory 
damages.4  Punitive damages, however, are not available: “The NMHRA provides that an employee may 
recover actual damages and reasonable attorneys’ fees.”  NMSA 1978, §§28-1-11(E), 28-1-13(D).  This 
has been interpreted to be confined to compensatory damages. See Trujillo, 2001-NMSC-004, ¶30 
(“[T]he Human Rights Act does not permit the award of punitive damages.”); Gandy v. Wal-Mart Stores, 
Inc., 117 N.M. 441, 443, 872 P.2d 859, 861 (1994) (“Punitive damages… are not recoverable under the 
Human Rights Act.”)” (DRI, 2011, p. 266). 
                                                 
4 Also see http://www.lawatbdb.com/employee-rights/file_NM?agree=yes (viewed February 2, 2015). 
New York 
According to the New York law (N.Y. Executive Law §297(4)(c)) “(iii) awarding of compensatory 
damages to the person aggrieved by such practice; (iv) awarding of punitive damages, in cases of housing 
discrimination only…”  However, according to DRI (2011, p. 274), the compensatory damages that are 
available are uncapped, and there are civil fines available that mirror capped punitive damages: “As of 
July 6, 2009, the HRL was amended to provide for the assessment of civil fines and penalties against any 
employer found to have engaged in an unlawful discriminatory practice.  The fines may be imposed in an 
amount up to $50,000, or up to $100,000 where the conduct is found to be willful, wanton or malicious” 
(DRI, 2011, p. 274). 
North Dakota 
“Neither the department nor an administrative hearing officer may order compensatory or punitive 
damages under this chapter” (N.D. Cent. Code §14-02.4-20). 
Oklahoma 
Unlike for other protected classes in Oklahoma, aggrieved employees with claims of disability 
discrimination were previously able to pursue a private action and receive compensatory damages (DRI, 




2011, c. 270, § 21) repealed Okla. Stat. tit. 25, §§1901.  It appears that punitive damages were never 
available, as neither statute nor DRI (2011, p. 317) mention them as having been available. 
Pennsylvania 
According to the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act (43 P.S. §§ 951–63), compensatory damages are 
available but there is no mention of punitive damages.  DRI (2011, p. 340) argues that they are not 
available, citing Hoy v. Angelone, 554, Pa. 134, 720 A.2d 745 (1998), which stated: “[i]n sum, we are of 
the view that the Legislature’s silence on the issue of punitive damages, together with the statutory 
language, interpreted consistent with the laws of statutory construction and in the context of the nature 
and purpose of the Act, requires the conclusion that the Legislature did not intend to permit the award of 
exemplary damages.” 
South Dakota 
According to South Dakota’s discrimination law, compensatory damages are available, but punitive 
damages are not available.  More specifically, the statute states that “…In a civil action, if the court or 
jury finds that an unfair or discriminatory practice has occurred, it may award the charging party 
compensatory damages.  The court may grant as relief any injunctive order, including affirmative action, 
to effectuate the purpose of this chapter.  Punitive damages may be awarded under § 21-3-2 for a 
violation of §§ 20-13-20 to 20-13-21.2, inclusive, 20-13-23.4, or 20-13-23.7” (SDCL §20-13-35.1).  
However, the listed sections where punitive damages are allowed do not apply to employment 
discrimination based on disability. 
Tennessee 
According to case law notes from Westlaw (2013c, p. 18), under both the Tennessee Human Rights Act 
(THRA) and Tennessee Handicap Act (THA), compensatory damages are allowed.  DRI (2011, p. 379) 
argues that punitive damages are not available, citing Carver v. Citizen Utils. Co., 954 S.W.2d 34 (Tenn. 
1997).  See also Forbes v. Wilson County Emergency Dist. 911 Bd., 1998, 966 S.W.2d 417, as cited by 
Westlaw (2013c, p. 18). 
Utah 
The Utah Anti-Discrimination Act states that the following relief is available for those successful in an 
employment discrimination claim: 
“(b) provide relief to the complaining party, including: 
(i) reinstatement; 
(ii) back pay and benefits; 
(iii) attorneys' fees; and 
(iv) costs” (U.C.A. §34A-5-107(9)(b)).  
Neither compensatory or punitive damages are mentioned.  According to DRI (2011, p. 391), Utah does 
not allow compensatory or punitive damages. 
Virginia 
According to Virginians with Disabilities Act: “Any circuit court having jurisdiction and venue pursuant 
to Title 8.01, on the petition of any person with a disability, shall have the right to enjoin the abridgement 
of rights set forth in this chapter and to order such affirmative equitable relief as is appropriate and to 
award compensatory damages and to award to a prevailing party reasonable attorneys’ fees, except that a 
defendant shall not be entitled to an award of attorneys’ fees unless the court finds that the claim was 




damages for pain and suffering. Punitive or exemplary damages shall not be awarded” (Va. Code §51.5-
46(A).). 
Washington 
Washington’s employment nondiscrimination law (R.C.W. §49.60.030) states that “actual damages” are 
available, which has been interpreted to be uncapped compensatory damages (DRI, 2011, p. 491; online 
source).  DRI (2011, p. 491) states that punitive damages are not allowed.5 
                                                 
5 See also http://www.workplacefairness.org/file_WA (viewed February 3, 2014). 
Wisconsin 
For most of its history, the Wisconsin Fair Employment Act allowed neither compensatory nor punitive 
damages.  For a brief period between the passage of 2009 Act 20 (effective June 8, 2009) and the passage 
of 2011 Act 219 (effective April 20, 2012), the Wisconsin Fair Employment Act allowed the same 
damages as the ADA. 
Wyoming 
The Wyoming Fair Employment Practices Act (Wyo. Stat. 27-9-101 et seq.) does not mention 
compensatory or punitive damages, or a lack thereof.  DRI (2011, p. 449) seems to suggest that these 
damages are not available. 
States with No Law 
Alabama 
Alabama only has an employment nondiscrimination law that protects older workers, but not any other 
groups. 
Mississippi 
Mississippi does not have an employment nondiscrimination law. 
 
